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t.be search for a secure peace. 




STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. , MONTANA) 
THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY 
Mr. President: 
Let me preface my remarks with this assurance to the Senate. I am 
not an alarmist. I measure the words I am about to speak most carefully In 
that context , I express to the Senate my belief that just ahead lies the most 
critical period which the United States will have had to face since the conflict 
in Korea. It is a pe~-w~h-me.f-w&J..-1. se& th&-nat4oo-&Bd-ta&-r&St-o!!-the-
wr1d m1 ss_.a-devestat1og war--by a-¥ery- narr-ow .merg4.n~ lndeedy-±t is a pertud 
W~-se&-\lS-iB-W8l'z-l:l:mited war -&P Wl.Hmi ted W8r) we:r-by-aee-ident-or-war-
"by Elesig&z=WQP-by-ehi-ld4sh~~--GJI-b~. 
The crisis1 Mr. President, is coming in Germany. Specifically it 
is coming in Berlin. Indeed, it m3.y have already begun. For years now, the 
seeds of that crisis have lain dormant in a divided Germany. They have been 
held in check only by a kind of mutual acquiescence. The Western powers have 
not wished to disturb the seeming stability i n Germany. Since the Berlin 
blockade, the Soviet Union has not seriously threatened it. A few years ago, 
uprisings ot East Germans shook the stability but did not break it. 
Those who have thought at all about the German situation have known 
for a long time that the surface calm would not last. The existence of two 
German authorities in what is one Germany bas been, from the end of World War 
II , a makeshift arrangement . The Western powers have recognized it. The 
Soviet Union has acknowledged it. The German leaders know it. 
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The key question has never been: will Germany be unified? The 
question has long bee~: when and how will Germany be unified? Those of us 
who have urged an initiative in American policy with respect to Germany have 
been aware of this distinction. ~fuen I addressed myself to this subject in the 
Senate in May, 1958, I had the distinction very much in mind. Because I did, I 
tried to deal in the specifics of an American initiative. In suggesting, last 
May, alternatives to present policy1 my thought was that when the status quo 
gave way, as surely it must, the changes ought at least to hold promise of 
leading to the stren3thening of freedom in a peaceful Germany. 
We did nothing, Mr. President. We took no initiative. We went on 
in the familiar vacuousness 1 in the familiar patterns of policy, patterns de-
~ 
vi sed years ago, in another. setting, under another Administration. We refused 
~ 
~o face the fact that that policy was adequate to maintain a semblance of 
stability in Germany only so long as all directly concerned acquiesced in the 
continued division of that nation. w.fl_ 
That is water under the bridge. ~~1a'a.t:t:on did not choose 
to act in a positive fashion to change the status quo. Now, the Russians have 
chosen to break it. They have chosen to make the break at Berlin. They have 
said, in effect, that, after the spring of 1959, the situation will no longer 
be as it has been in that city. They are quite right, Mr. President. Things 
will no longer be the same in Berlin or anywhere in Germany. If there is 
any certainty, it is that the situatio:n in Germe.ny at the close of 1959 will 
be fa~ different from the present situation. We are approaching the beginning 
of the end, the begi~ing of the end of two Berlins and of two Germanies. 
The question, as I have already observed, was never, would Germany 
iS ..A._ 
be unified? It was when and how would Germany be unified? 'l!he-A~ 
may now have begun to comprehend the when, the actual process of unification 
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is likely to begin this year. Only one question remains: how is Germany to be 
unified? Will it be by conflict, by negotiation, or by some mixt'll:'e of the two? 
That is the question which is ~elling us and the rest of the world towards 
the coming crisis in Germany. 
Constitutional Responsibilities in the German Crisis 
The responsibility for establishing binding foreign policies to deal 
with the impending crisis, the coming change in Germany, rests solely with the 
President and his Secretary of State. Let there be no doubt on that score , in 
this b?dy, at home, in the Executive Branch or abroad. It is not for the 
Senate to direct the President in this matter. The President will have to make 
his own decisions with the assistance of the vast resources of the Executive 
Branch. When he speaks officially on Germany, however , he will be speaking for 
all of us whether or not we agree with what he says. ~re is no other .Y.!}Y_ 
under the Constitutional system of the lJnited Stat~. 
To say that is not to constrain upon the Senate a silence in these 
matters. On the contrary, since we wil1 be bound, since the people of the 
United States shall be bound by what the President and his Secretary of State 
do or fail to do in the coming crisis the obligation of the Senate to debate, 
to discuss, and to advise is real and it is comwelling. 
This Senate of the 86th Congress was not constituted so that it might 
ignore pressing domestic questions. How much less then, can we remain silent 
on the life and death matters of foreign policy? The President and the Secre-
tary of State have given no indication that they would have this body turn its 
back on the crisis in Germany. On the contrary; I note that the Secretary of 
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State has already sought the counsel of the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Fulbright). I commend the Secretaryfbr his 
initiative. The brillient chairman of the Committee has much to contribute to 
the development of policy for the situation in Germany. 
If the Senate is to meet its responsibilities, Mr. President, we must 
form, through debate and discussion, an understanding of the situation as it is 
and as it is evolving in Germany. \ole must also discern clearly the stakes of 
the people of the United States and of freedom in that situation. We must ad-
vance, finally, ideas for consideration in formu2ating the foreign policies 
which are to safeguard the vital interests of our people. 
These are the thoughts which have led me to these remarks on the 
coming crisis in Germany. I make them in the spirit of responsible Democratic 
cooperation with a Republican Administration in a matter of vital concern to 
all the people of the United States. 
Two German Authorities in O~e Germany 
Let me begin by exploring the significant realities in Germany, as I 
see them. The basic reality, Mr. President, is that there are two political 
authorities in one Germany. That is a contradiction which cannot and will not 
stand. There is one Germany. And there are con:pelling historic and practical 
reasons which require that the ~ity of that nation begin to emerge without 
delay if there is to be peace in Europe and in the world. 
I stress the point, Mr. President, that when we speak of the two 
Germanies, we are really speaking not of two nations but of two political 
authorities. Each of these authorities presumes that it is the wave of the 
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future in all Germany. Each seeks to draw the whole of the German people into 
its orbit. 
To be sure, there are profound differences between the West German 
government in Bonn and the East German communist regime in Pankow. The Bonn 
government is based upon prlnc:lples and practices of democracy which are con-
sonant with those of other western nations and are expressly supported by the 
inhabitants of West Germany. The Pankow regime exists by the methods of au-
thoritarianisn which come from the East. Its source of authority lies in the 
will to power of those who wield the authority and the acquiescence--however 
sullen--of the repressed people of East Germany. Its survival depends , to a 
far greater degree than anything we know in the Western democracies, on military 
and police power--its own and the Soviet Union's. 
The West German democratic government exists. It is there, at Bonn, 
and the cOlllllunists are not going to wish it away or subvert it away. It is 
going to stay as long as the people in that zone sustain it and as long as the 
Western nations remain committed to its protection against military aggression 
from the East. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that the East German regime 
also exists. It is there at Pankow, a.nd German communists run it, even though 
Russians may pull the strings from behind the curtain. Unfortunately, I see 
no evidence that the Western nations are going to wish away or subvert away 
that East German political authority in the practicable future . 
If neither side can be wished away, or subverted away, how then is 
the division of Germany going to be made to disappear? How is a unified 
Germany& this essential Germany, this inevitable Germany, going to emerge? 
There was a time, perhaps, when it might have been reasonable to hope that 
the Russians and German communists would soon find it too costly to maintain 
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their control in East Germany. For ye.a.rs we have waited for this promised 
development. We have waited for the Russians and their camp-followers to fold 
their tents and steal away. 
What we must ask ourselves now is whether or not there is any realis-
tic basi s for hoping that this development will come about in the practicable 
future? I regret to say that such public indications as there are suggest that 
the Pankow regime, with Soviet support, is consolidating its position, that its 
authoritarian hold on East Germany is , if anything, more secure today than it 
was a few years ago. 
If the Administration has information to the contrary, then it would 
be helpful if it shared that information with the Senate and the people of the 
nation. It would be helpful if the Administration would give us an estimate 
of the probable life span of the East German regime. Will it take a month) a 
year , five years or a decade for it to expire peacefully under present poli-
--........ 
cies? 
It is all very well to hope, as a general principle, for the disap-
pearance of totalitarianism. ~le have held that principle for decades, but we 
have also had to live in a world which has contained since its beginning and 
still contains many totalitarian regimes. 
No, Mr . President, a valid policy on Germany, now, must be built on 
more than the hope of the eventual disappearance of German totalitarianism. 
It can on1y be built on the premise that Germany, in one way or another , is 
going to unify and it is going to begin to unify soon. Further, it can only 
be built on the premise that that unity in Germany, if it is to come in peace, 
is likely to fall short of the ultimate goals set for it by both the Communist 
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natiQas ~d ih~ free nations- -the goal , on the one hand, of a communist totali-
tarian Germany ~d the goal, on the other, of a fully representative democracy 
in al l Germany. 
Until a few months ago there might have been a possibility of evading 
that r eality for a whil e longer by assuming that the status quo of division in 
Germany might go on indefinitely. But the pr ospect of evasion is now narrow-
ing r apidly in the wake of Mr. Khrushchev 1 s announcement of the coming Soviet 
withdrawal from Berlin. The blunt fact is that soon, either negotiations lead-
ing to German unification in peace shall begin in earnest or there shall begin 
in earnest the use of f orce to that end. 
Berlin--The Core of the Coming Crisis 
This brings me to a second matter which we must explore, Mr. Presi-
dent, if we are to see our way clearly in the impending crisis . That is the 
question of Berlin. It is at Berlin, divided Berlin, and along the western 
routes of access to the city, that the first indications of the conflict lead-
ing to war or the success of negotiations leading to stable peace are likely 
to appear in the coming months. 
I shall not take the time of the Senate to review the historic 
circumstances surrounding the present difficulties of the Western position in 
Berlin. It is simple enough to find fault with what was done or not done by 
political and military leaders years ago. It is as easy, as it is pompous, 
to pass angry judgments on others, with the prop of hindsight. That process 
will serve no useful purpose in this situation. 
Nor shall I take the time of the Senate to review the legal status 
~
of our position in Berlin. ..!!'he-Executive-Branch may find some solace for our 
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difficulties in legalism. Even the Russians sought justification for their 
a.ctions in it. But legalism is at best a dubious way to deal with an explosive 
situation, when there are, as there are in this situation, two opposing judges, 
two opposing judgments, and two opposing instrume~ts of mass destruction for 
enforcing t ee jue.grnents. 
It does not much matter now1 bow we got to F.e:..· .~in nor why t he 
Russians have no legal right to ask us to leave . Ynnat does ~tter, Mr. 
President, is Why we need to s~y in Berlin, as stay there we must . We 
are, bluntly, in a biehJ.y difficult and dangerous position in Berlin. Great 
sa.crifices may be entailed in remaining. We bad better understand cl ear1y 
now the significance of maintai ning our position there. We bad better under-
stand now what is vital and what is not vital in that position to the people 
of the United States and to freedom. 
The Administration has responded to the Russian proposals on Berlin 
by reiterati.ng a long- standing view of the nation. It bas said, as the 
Democratic Administration before it said, that we will not be driven from 
the city. The position of this government, to stand firm in Berlin, bas been 
endorsed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is supported by Demo-
crats and Republicans alike in the Senate. 
It is a sound position. Only it is not enough. It is not enoU§b 
to say, Mr. President, that we are standing fast in Berlin . That is a slogan 
not a policy. Nor is it enough~ Mr. President, to stand fast merely to 
demonstrate our determination to maintain our legal interpretation of the 
situation as against the Soviet Union's. 
Nor is it enough, t.fr. President, to say that we stand fast in Ber lin 
so that we may continue to demonstrate in the heaxt of Communist Germany the 
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material superiority of freedom or free enterprise over communist collectivism. 
To be sure there is a striking contrast between West Berlin and East Berlin 
but I doubt very much that the people of the United States will countenance 
the sacrifice of a single human life for the purposes of propagandistic demon-
strations in Berlin. And before this year is out many lives may have been 
spent in Berlin. 
No, Mr. President, it is not for reasons of legalism or propaganda 
that we stand fast in Berlin. The Western nations are in Berlin< Mr. Presi-
dent, because Berlin belongs neither to East Germany nor West Germany; it be-
longs to all the German people. We are in Berlin because some Germans may now 
look to Bonn and others to Pankow for leadership, but all Germans will soon 
look to Berlin. We are in Berlin to see to it that when that city is once 
again the capital of all Germany. as it surely will be, the concept of freedom 
in peace will not be absent from the scene. If that concept were to disappear 
from Berlin, the citadel of German nationalism, sooner or later, it would dis-
appear from all Germany. Then, sooner or later, the torch would be lit in 
Germany, whether by German hands or some other, to set Europe and the world 
aflame once again. That torch was lit twice in Berlin in the past and twice 
the world has paid an enormous human price. To see that it is not lit again 
is in the essential, the vital interests of this generation and future genera-
tions of the people of the United States. 
That, Mr. President, is the reason which beyond all others, justi-
fies the taking of the great risks which we may soon be called upon to take 
at Berlin and along the western routes to the city. We are in Berlin in 
order to get out, but to get out Only on condition that the German political 
forces which stand for freedom in peace have a sure footing, an equal chance 
to survive and to grow on their merits in the future capital of all Germany. 
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I support fully the position of this Administration on the necessity 
of standing fast in Berlin . I question however, the adequacy with which tbe-
JUhnioistration ~ related that position to the changing situation in Germany. 
I question a policy which provides that not o~v we stand fast in Berlin, but 
also implo1·es or demands that the Russians stand fast. After Y_ears of trying 
to get the Russians out of the innumerable places into which they sprawled 
after World War II , it is indeed st range to hear that we are insisting that 
the Russians must not, indeed, cannot leave Berlin. That is, Mr. President, a 
most peculiar position to say the least1 and the Russians obvi ously have no 
intention of obliging us by remaining. 
It is clear what is afoot there . In a few months hence, the 
Russians will leave East Berlin despite our commands or urgings to the con-
trary. East Berlin will then be.1 once again, a German city- -communist, to be 
sure--but nevertheless German. By contrast, West Berlin will r etain the ap-
pearance it now has, the appearance of a Western enclave in the heart of 
Germany, for there are thousands of allied officials and military personnel 
in the area. The contrast will not be lost on German nationalists, in East 
or West Germany. 
Further, Mr. President, if we ar e to hold this enclave without 
struggle, it will be at the sufferance of the East German Communist authori -
ties. If they do not choose to accommodate us, then we shall in all probabi-
lity have to fight our way through to Berlin, not against Russians but against 
Germans . Even if this course does not lead to a great conflict, the repercus-
sions in Germany will be profound. Among Germans, as among others, blood may 
prove thicker than ideologies. 
As I said, Mr. President, there can be no quarrel with the need to 
stand fast in Berlin. I do question, however, a policy which does not 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 40, Folder 14, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 11 -
anticipate the developments which I have just outlined and fails to take steps 
to mitigate them. 
I question, too, a policy which still pr esumes as our policy does 
that the Great Powers of World War l i- -the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
France, ani the United States--can bring about German unification. There may 
have been a time when such a course was possible. If it ever existed, however, 
it was years ago when Germany lay devastated and prostrate . It was years ago. 
in the freshness of the common sacrifices of Wor~ ,l. War II anc. i.n the meaFo• "":"e 
of mutual respect and toler ance which these sac~~fices engende=ed. 
Those years are gone. The time is not today. Today, there is 
little respect between this nation and the Soviet Union except the fearful 
respect which the military power of the one may gener ate in the other. Today, 
Germany is neither devastated nor prostrate, it r~s become once again the most 
dynamic nation in Western Europe . 
No, Mr. Presiient1 the erstwhile allies, the divided allies of 
World War II are not in a position to ordein a unification in peace for a 
revitalized Germany. At most, they cay be able to contribute to ~t unifica-
tion by rethinking their own security needs in anticipation of its inevitable 
development . At most, they may be able to contribute to unification by exer-
cising such influence as they may possess to encourage the Germans themselves 
to reach a reasonable procedure on unification and by sanctioning that pro-
cedure if it is sound . It is the Germans, themselves, however , who will make 
the decisive decisions on unification, if they are to be made in peace. 
Free All-German Elections 
Furthe~ Mr. President, I question, in present circumstances, a 
policy which presumes to lead to the peaceful unification1 of Germany solely 
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on the basis of free , all-German elections. I say now what I said last May 
on this point, only with more emphasis. Events have moved a long way since 
this policy was devised and the bell no longer has an altogether recognizable 
sound when it is rung over and over again in the same fashion. A german poli-
tical av.thori ty has emerged in tie West. Another political structure has ap-
peared i~ the East which is manned by Germans, even if it is not directed by 
them. Whatever we may think of this structure, there is no reliable indica-
tion that it is going to go away, peacefully, of its own accord. 
There are now military and para=mili tary German forces in both East 
and West Germany. How are these forces to be integrated in peace? Is this 
a problem that can be solved by free, all-German elections, at least without 
extensive preparations by the Germans who officer these opposing forces? 
There are differing economic and social structures functioning in 
Western and Eastern Germany. How are these structures to be fused in peace? 
Can they be harmonized by free, all-German elections, at least without ex-
tensive preparations by those Germans who operate them? 
I cite these proble:ns as e:xamples. There are no doubt others of a 
similar nature. A policy which advances no thought on how they are to be 
met does not begin to meet the realities of the German situation. If the 
unification of Germany is essential and inevitable and if it is neither our 
responsibility nor in the interest of this nation to seek that unity by 
force then I submit that a. pol:fg¥ which merely clings to an unrealizable 
slogan of free a.ll-C~rman elections, which does not pursue German unification 
by other means, is no policy at all. It is a strait-jacket. It is an excuse 
for immobility. It may well lead down the blind alley of an unnecessary con-
flict or disastrous diplomatic retreat. 
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Military Withdrawal in Germany and Central Euro;pe 
Finally4 Mr. President. I question a policy which a;ppears to regard 
as sacrosanct presP.nt military arrangements in Germany and Central Europe. 
I can understand, I can accept, I can support the concept that Western 
Germany's ties with Western Europe are essential to the peace of Europe and 
they must not be broken. Within that concept, however, I cannot comprehend 
a view which seems to hold inflexibly to the present form and extent of German 
rearmament. We have accepted and even encouraged rises in the German military 
contribution to NATO in certain circumstances in the past. I do not see that 
we cannot accept and encourage declines in that contribution in other circum-
stances. 
Security needs are ever-changing needs. Western German rearmament 
is not an end in itself. It is for the purpose of the defense of German 
freedom in common with the defense of the freedom of the \ole stern connnuni ty. 
It is not for the purpose of keeping rigid the tables of organization and 
the projections of presumed needs by the military command of NATO. These 
projection~ in any event, have not been met for years and the world has not 
yet come to an end. 
The nature and extent of German rearmament and of non-German 
armaments on German soil, in short, is one area of the problem of unification 
in which reasonable proposals for negotiation, wherever they may originate, 
ought not to be rejected out of hand. That is especially the case if these 
proposals are related to the reduction of militexy power throughout Central 
Europe. I know full well that the Russians may have no intention of with-
drawing from the Eastern European states in any circumstances. Nevertheless, 
I can see no reason to make it easier for them to justify their remaining by 
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a seeming intransigence on our part. I cannot see that the road to the 
eventual freedom of states like Poland and Czechoslovakia is made easier by 
such a process. 
Russian Role in the Coming Cri~ 
Mr. President, let me turn now to the ~uestion of Russian inten-
tions in the coming crisis in Germany. In this matter there is only one 
certain course. Wba tever they may do, we must assume that the Russians a~e 
acting to enhance the position of the Soviet Union and that of totalitari~n 
communism throug!lout Germany and Europe. We must also assume that they will 
use whatever methods they believe will lead to these ends, not excluding 
aggressive war. The Russians may blow hot or they may blow cold. They may 
down e. plane on their border one day. They may release e. blocked convoy the 
next. We cannot know w1 th certainty why they act as t!:ey act at any given 
moment. 
We cannot know with certainty the purport of Mr. Mikoyan 1 s recent 
visit to the United States. We cannot know with certainty the meaning of 
Mr. Khrushchev 1 s comments on a thaw in the cold war. They may be meant to 
provide a setting for successful negotiations. They may be meant simply to 
confuse or beguile. 
If they do confuse, if they do beguile, however, we shall have no 
one to blame but ourselves. We ought to be able by this time I years after 
the ill- fated Geneva. Conference of 1255, to distinguish between the concilia-
tory gesture and the act of conciliation. Those of us who came from the cold 
country have learned througo bitter experience that winter thaws can be 
followed by summer frosts. The promise of spring in February is not the 
same as the coming of spring in May. 
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There is, a.s I sa.y, no way of knowing with certainty wha.t some 
particular Soviet gesture or other signifies . What we can know, Mr. President, 
is tha.t they a.re all> good or ba.d, peripheral to t he crisis which is coming 
in Germany. Mr . Miko:tan 1 s visit is not going to free us from that crisi s. 
Mr. Krxuohchev ' s thaws will not do it. Increased Soviet-American trade has 
little relation to it. 
If we a.re to be prepared to fa.ce this crisis in Germany, it will be 
best not to become distracted or obsessed by the twists a.nd turns of Soviet 
behavior. It will be best to keep our eyes on Germe.ny. The fundementa.l 
question of policy for us is not so much what the Russians are looking for 
in Germany. We know what they a.re looking for and they may very well seize 
it while we amuse or fascinate ourselves by tEYfng to interpret the charades 
of Russian behavior. 
No, Mr. President, more important, fa.r more important to us is to 
know vhat we ourselves a.re seeking in Germany. We must bring to this crisis 
not onl.y courage but also conviction. We must brin~ to it a positive a.nd 
understandable policy which roeets our essential national needs a.nd the 
essential needs of freedom. 
The Essentials of a \-~estern Policy in the Coming Crisis 
As I noted earlier in my remarks , it is not for the Senate to 
direct the President a.nd the Secretary of State in the conduct of the foreign 
reJations of the United Sta.tee . But it is a. responsibility of Senators to 
try to contribute constructive!Y to the policies which govern those relations. 
It is in that sense, Mr. President, tha.t I seek, in these final comments, to 
express the thoughts which this exploration suggests, thoughts on the 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 40, Folder 14, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 16 -
essentials of a sound Western policy for the coming crisis in Germany . I 
have no crystal ball. I have no secret information. What I suggest may not 
be valid in the light of the greater understanding of others . It is one 
Senator's views based upon what he has read, what he has heard, what he has 
tried to reason. It is, in short, the course which suggests itself to me on 
the basis of the understanding which I have been able to draw out of the con-
fusion and complexity of the German situation. I can be wrong ·and I stand 
ready to accept a better illumination of the pr oblem through discussion and 
debate in the Senate. For whatever they may be worth, however, I outli.ne 
the following points as essentials of a sound Western policy on Germany: 
1. It is essential, l4r. President, that forces representing the concept 
of freedom in peace not be driven out of Berlin. They need, at the 
least , to remain on the basis of equality with the forces of totali-
tarian communi sm in the future capital of Germa?l · If those forces 
are to have a cban~e to remain in peace a Western initiative for 
peace is essential . 
2. It is time to call upon German leaders of the two Berlin communities 
--East and West- - to begin serious efforts to unify the municipal 
government and public services of that city. 
3· To that end, Mr. President, it would be helpful to enlist the con-
ciliatory services of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
If agreement ce.n be reached by East and vlest Germany to establish 
an all-Berlin government, then it will be desirable to replace both 
Soviet and Allied forces with a United Nations police force composed 
of contingents from nations not directly involved. That force 
might supervise the agreement and see to it that all the routes of 
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access to the city remain open until Derlin becomes once again the 
capital of a peaceful unified Germany. It may be that in the Derlin 
microcosm there may evolve patterns of unification which 'vill be ap-
plicable to the larger problem of all-German unification. 
4. If this approach or some such approach to a unified, neutralized Derlin 
fails, Mr . President, then it is essential that the forces representing 
the concept of freedom in peace in Derlin remain in Derlin whether or 
not the Russians leave . Let them go, if they will. I would not wish 
to see this country a party to any insistence that they stay. 
5. At the same time, however, the forces representing freedom in Derlin 
must be Germanized as rapidly as possible. It is time to think 
seriously of replacing the thousands of Allied military personnel in 
Dcrlin with German militia., fully supported by NATO suare.ntees. 
6 . Some may regard discussions between Germans of the \~est and Germans of 
the East as tantamount to recognition of the East German regime. Some 
who regard not only talk, but even thought, which is apparently alien 
to them, on the serious problems of the Nation, as appeasement, may 
even go so far as to label any proposals of meetings between East and 
West Germans with this stamp of political chicanery. Let them do it, 
Mr. President. It is their privilege. 
~t let me say this: If talk constitutes recognition 
or appeasement then t&!~ -Adm:lni~tratioa has appeased and rec-
ognized Communist China because a representative of this government 
has been talking on its behalf, on and off for years, with a Chinese 
Con:munist representative in Geneva and llarsaw. If talk constitutes 
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recognition or appeasement then the ¥Test Germans have recognized and 
and appeased Pankow for years. The fact is that East and West Germans 
have worked out practical agreements of various kinds between the two 
zones of Germany. As early as ~957 Nest Germany's exports to East 
Germany for the year totaled $201 million. During the first half of 
1958 $125 million in trade moved 1n each direction . That kind of trade, 
Mr. President, does not take place without talk. 
I do not know what the theory of inter national law may be. I 
do not know whether talk is tantamount to recognition. I do know that, 
as a practical matter, we have talked with but not recognized Communist 
China. ¥lest Germans have talked with and traded with but not recognized 
Pankow. What is involved in the coming crisis 1n Germany is not a 
classroom problem of the theory of international law. It is the life 
and death problem of peace and war. The stake is the lives of tens of 
millions of human beings, Americans included . 
I cannot see that there is going to be any peaceful solution 
of th~s problem without talk, a great deal of talkzt between Germans wl:o 
are in author ity in the Federal Republic ~~d Germans who purport to be 
in authority in the Eastern zone. It seems to me essential, moreover, 
that~bis t.~:_1-~.k cover the whole range of problems of unification of the 
two zones, the whol e range of problems involving the harmonizing of the 
political, economic and military systems of the two zones. 
7 . There is a :;?Oi nt beyond vThich the search for peace can lead to the 
jeopardizi~S of freedom. It seems to me essential that whatever 
agreements emerge, the people of Eastern Germany must have some genuine 
choice in the form of control which is exercised over them. There must 
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be provision for the protection of the rigpts of all peaceful polit ical 
forces in all Germany. All-German el ections may not be essential- -but 
at least there must be a chance for men and women of Easter n Germany 
as well as Western Germany to express themselves and their political 
preferences and to participate in political affairs without the threat 
of terror. 
Whatever the details of the fusion of the two zones, they are 
best left to the Germans of the two zones. The Germans are likely to 
know better than anyone else what will suit them, what is possible among 
them. Further, it is inconceivable that the erstwhile allies of Wor ld 
War II can work out these details on their behalf at this late date . 
8. The contribution which the Western allies as ~rell as the Soviet Union 
need to make, if there is to be peace, is to guarantee for a period of 
timet the kind of unified Germany which may emerge from discussions 
among the Germans. What the former allies need to do is to see to it 
that a unified Germany is neither subjected to military pressures from 
its neighbors nor that it becomes a source of military pressure to its 
neighbors. 
9· To that end, Mr. President, it is essential to include within the scope 
of our policy the search for agreements which,while they do not compel 
a severance of West Germany's numerous ties with Western Europe, may 
lead to limitations of armaments throughout Germany and Central Europe. 
Agreements are needed, too, 'vhich will pull back the so-called ultimate 
weapons and the armed forces of both East and West from the points of 
imminent contact in Germany and Central Europe . In short, Mr . President 
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it seems to me essential that our policy, NATO's policies, do not ex-
clude a careful consideration of the Rapacki Plan, the Eden Plan for a 
demilitarized zone in Middle Europe or similar proposals in connection 
with the unification of Germany. Perhaps the best way to consider these 
matters would be to predicate them on ageeements which may emerge from 
the Geneva Conferences on Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of Nu-
clear Tests. 
****** 
Mr. President, I have taken a great deal of the Senate 's time today. 
I have tried not to take it lightly. I have done so because it is clear that 
this Administration, following the example of its predecessor, has committed the 
nation to stand fast at Berlin. 
It is a resolve well taken. Since we cannot yet perceive to what 
extremity of sacrifice it may lead in the months ahead, I have felt it essential 
to try to set forth for the consideration of the Senate my understanding of what 
is involved in the coming crisis in Germany. I am grateful that in this crucial 
time the Senate's principal member in these matters, the outstanding Senator 
from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) is a man with such a deep understanding and in-
telligent grasp of the international forces that play on the nation. I hope 
that he will make his voice heardi I am sure that the President and the Secre-
tary of State will listen most carefully. I would hope, further, that between 
them will evolve a policy that all of us, as Americans, will be glad to support. 
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Most important, Mr. President, I hope that the President of the 
United States, his Secretary of State, and the Congress will fortify the 
resolve to stand fast in Berlin with the conviction which only a positive 
policy for peace can give it. The Secretary of State ha.s spoken of mutual 
concessions. Those are calm and wise words for this moment in time, with the 
clouds of radioactive death waiting to envelope the earth. I hope, deeply, 
that they will lead to a positive policy for peace. It is that kind of a 
policy for which rational men everywhere are waiting. It is that kind of a 
policy which they will be able to comprehend and to which, if need be, they 
will be able willingly to consecrate their lives. 
That policy bas yet to be formed. It needs to be formed soon . If 
it is formed> the concept of freedom in peace will not perish in Berlin, in 
Germany or in the world. 
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SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD 
THE COM IN G CRIS I S IN GERMANY 
ILLNESS OF SECIU:I' ARY OF STATE 
DULLES 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. be-
fore I proceed to the remarks which I 
Intend to make on the German situation, 
I wish to say that I am deeplJ1 distressed 
by the news of the lllncss o! the Secre-
tary o! State. 
The duties o! the Secretary of State 
are just about the most exacting and 
strenuous In the Government. not ex-
cluding the Presidency. The Intellectual 
demands o! the job are enormous. The 
physical demands arc appalling. For 
years. Secretary Dulles has borne up un-
der them without complaint. His stam-
Ina and durability have been little short 
or Incredible. However, In the Secretary, 
as In other men. there is a physical limit. 
Hts total personal dedication to the serv-
Ice o! the Nation has taken Its toll of 
his health. As one doctor put It, the 
Secretary Is worn out. It Is a shame, 
Mr President, that the Nation has re-
N 2~ 
quired so. much o! one man. And It Is 
to the Nation's detriment. moreover, that 
he has had to push himself beyond the 
limit. 
We can Ul afford to lose his services 
at any time. We can spare them least 
.at this moment. Secretary Dulles Is 
needed as never before to complete the 
very delicate negotiations on Berlin and 
Germany which he had just begun so 
a usplclously. 
Mr. Dulles has capaole associates In 
the Department of State. With all due 
respect to them, however, the Secretary 
will be sorely miSsed In the weeks ahead, 
The Nation needs his great experience, 
his balance, his strength, his ability to 
decide. 
I share with the President and the 
Nation the feeling of distress which the 
Secretary's illness brings. I know the 
Senate joins with me in wishing Mr. 
Dulles a full recovery and a prompt re-
turn to his key role In the search for a 
secure peace. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will 
the Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I endorse every-
thing that has been said by the distin-
guished Senator from Montana concern-
Ing the illness of Secretary or State 
Dulles and the work which he has been 
doing. I have often marveled, as I am 
certain many other persons have, at his 
stamina. I tecall reading In the press 
recently that during the time Mr. Dulles 
has been Secretary of State, he has 
traveled more than 500,000 mUes. He 
has made many long journeys, and often 
after his return, perhaps within a day or 
two, he would be oli on another long 
trip. 
I first knew Mr. Dulles when he 
served for a short time in the United 
States Senate. But I came to know 
him better when J. served with him in 
the United Nations as a delegate In 1950 
and, subsequent to that time, for the 
ensuing 12 months. 
On September 8, 1950, at about 12 
o'clock' noon, President Truman called 
Mr. Dulles to the White House. Mr. 
Dulles at that time was an assistant m 
the Department of State under the then 
Secretary of State Acheson. President 
Truman asked Mr. Dulles on that day i1 
he would be willing to assume the re-
sponsibility of formulating the Japanese 
Peace Treaty, and In getting the two 
score or more nation~ which would be 
parties to the con!erence to agree to 
its general terms. 
If an assignment can be imagined 
which was more difficult and more com-
plex than that of bringing together some 
40 nations of the world which were great-
ly concerned about the terms of the Japa-
nese peace treaty, I cannot conceive of lt. 
But Mr. Dulles undertook to do the JOb. 
Mr. Dulles told me later that President 
Truman asked him at the time how long 
it would take. Mr. Dulles replied that 
he thought it would take a year. Mr. 
Truman then said, "I will give you one 
year in which to finish the job." 
At that time I was the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of 
the Comnuttee on Foreign Relations. I 
became a member of the committee in 
January 1951. Naturally, I had a clo:>c 
relationslup v.;th Mr. Dulles in his work 
during the entire year 1951. I was in 
conference frequently with him, because 
this was a Far Eastern question. The 
subcommittee and our assistants met 
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with Mr. Dulles at all times of the day, 
sometimes In the morning, sometimes at 
lunch, sometimes In the afternoons or 
evenings. I feel quJte certain that dur-
Ing the time the treaty was being form-
ulated, the Subcommittee on Far East-
ern Affairs, Mr. Dulles, and his associ· 
ates had probably 100 different meetings. 
I have often said It was one of the most 
remarkable jobs I ever saw any man per-
form . I t was not easy to bring together 
the British, on one hand, and the Na-
t ionalist Chinese, on the other. It was 
not easy to bring together the Southeast 
Asia. nations and the central European 
nations. But gradually Mr. Dulles wove 
a plan under which all nations were at 
least willing to attend a conference. 
The conference was held In the San 
Francisco Opera House. It ended on 
September 8, 1951. Just before we left 
the Opera House, I said to Mr. Dulles, 
"This Is the anniversary of the day you 
ltlldertook to do this work. At what 
time of the day did President Truman 
assign It to you?" Mr. Dulles replied 
that It was at 12 o'clock noon. I looked 
at my watch, and. making allowance for 
the difference In time between Washing-
ton and Calltornla, I said to him, "You 
have 8 minutes to spare." In other 
words, the time lacked 8 minutes of 
being 1 year from the time Mr. Dullea 
had undertaken to do the work. 
Following the conference. former Sen-
ator Smith. of New Jersey; Mr. Dulles, 
a cting !or Mr. Truman and Secretary 
of State Acheson : and I visited " number 
of the Far Eastern coWltnes. We spen~ 
several weeks in Japan, working v. 1th 
the diiJercnt. groups there in arnvmg at 
understandlll!!S. as best we could, and 
working on the rather d1fficult. problem 
Involving Nnt1onahst Chma, pnrttcu-
l arly, and the whole China problem, as 
well. 
I t was tht'n that I came to admire Mr. 
Dulles. I ndm1red h1s t<·nac1t.y, his power 
of intellect, and hiS :.kill in negotiating. 
One of the great. S(.'t'Vices he has per-
formed ns Secretary of Statt' has been 
In t.he field of necollatln~ between na-
tions which had differences and prob-
lems wh1ch were most difficult to sotve. 
I share the fel'hn~ whtch has been 
expressed by my cood fliC'n<l , the Sena-
tor from Montana. a!! to the nt'('d for 
Mr. Dulles at present to deal \Hth the 
particular probh m about which the 
Senator from Montana v.:111 speak to us 
today. I nm deliGhted to know that 
smce Mr. Dullt>.s' ph)'l;lcnl condition IS 
such that his docto1s 11dvise his taking 
leave and <'ntcnng n hospital, he has 
acted on that aclvlce. I hope he \\ ll1 
remain a\1·ay fronl his work for as much 
time as v.1ll be nccc ary to result In a 
complete 1 cstoratlon of hts health. 
which I am confident \\Ill take place, 
beCIIU~C I kllO\Io .somethlllC Of the phys-
IC:JI stamina of the man. 
I wtsh him n speedy recovery and a 
return to Ius positiOn as Secretary or 
~;tate just as soon as h<' 16 able to do so. 
I lcrl C<'rtaln that his inftucnce '"lll be 
ft :t In the n<' otlatlons In the various 
confc.rcnccs \\'hlch will be hl'ld In the 
future. I know thnt his as~tlstants In 
the Dcpartnwnt of State who have 
workt'd with him for so long and so well 
w11l be able to carry on. I am sure they 
will support Mr. Dulle!!, and that hla 
negotiating ability will be felt 1n the con-
ferences, and will continue to be he)pful 
even In his absence. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. AIKEN. I have been very happy 
to hear the expressions of good will to-
ward Secretary Dulles which have been 
spoken today. I wish to join In them. 
I have been a member of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations only <l years, 
and have not been so,closely associated 
with the work of Mr. Dulles as has the 
Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN ]. 
for Instance, who has just concluded his 
very fine statement. 
I think few men In public life have 
given so much of their time during so 
many years of their lives to the formula-
tion and administration of foreign pol-
Icy as has Secretary Dulles. I know the 
Nation Is grateful to him tor h is accom-
plishments. I know ours Is a bipartisan 
gratefulness, also, as the Senator from 
Alabama has well expressed. 
I do not suppose that all of Mr. Dulles' 
plans have materialized as he hoped 
they would. But we must recall that he 
has been serving a.s Secretary of State 
and as adviser to the Secretary of State 
during one of the :most critical periods 
of history, and many of the most dl.al-
cu!L problems the world has faced have 
come before him for solution. We have 
seen the ooluUon of rome situations 
which were considered vlrtuaJly Insolu-
ble-for instance. the situation 1n 
Trieste. I know all of us are happy to 
learn that there are proopects of perma-
nE-nt peace and harmony In the ll'lland 
of Cyprus, where the Turlul and the 
Greeks have come to an agreement. 
I believe the whole world owes a con-
siderable debt to Mr. Dullt'S. I wish to 
jom my colleagues m hopmg that Mr. 
Dullt>s will have a speedy recovery, fol-
lowmg his trip to the hospital, and 
soon w1ll again be back at work. Even 
though everything may not have r.one 
as he hoped It would, yet I know of no 
ono who could hnve achieved n la~er 
perce-ntage of success than he has over 
thl'se troublesome years. 
~1r. MANSFIELD. I t.hank U1e Sena-
tor from vermont. 
Mr. CARL<;ON. Mr. P rc-;ldt'nt, will 
the Senator from Montana yie-ld to me? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Doca 
the Senator f1·om Montana yield to the 
Scn3.tor from K ansas? 
~1r. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very 
much the opportumty to associate my-
sctr with the remarks of the actmg ma.-
JOnty leader I Mr. ;:\1ANSFJ&J.D I. the Sen-
ator from Alnbamn !Mr. SP,\RKMAN), and 
the Senator from Vermont I Mr. AIKF.Nl. 
In re ard to t.he Secretary of State, Mr. 
Dulles. 
It Sl'em.~ to me tl1at at this time. which 
seems to be one of our great.cl;t lntcr-
nntlonal crises. our Nation and the 
other nations of the world can Ill afford 
to spare the services of tJl1s most able 
Dl9.!1. 
secretary Dulles has demonstrat~d not 
only his ability, but, It seems to me, a 
peculiar temperament for worklng In 
thl.s fleld. I think he gets that tempera-
ment and that background from being a 
great Christian layman. His Interests 
are ln people. I believe that Is what we 
need during this period 1n the world's 
history. I think that one of our prob·-
lems at the present ume Is to learn how 
to live with other people. Our genera-
tion has not done so well; as a matter 
of fact, we have fought about three wars 
In one generation. Somehow, In some 
way, our young people, the coming gen-
eration, must learn how to live. with other 
people. When we learn to do that, I ~­
lieve we shall be able to accompllsh 
much In bringing about the peace and 
the economic conditions that all us of 
are praying and hoping for. 
I wish for the Secretary of State a 
most speedy recovery. We need him. I 
know he will receive the best of care that 
doctors and medical skill can proVide. 
So we look forward to his return to 
service. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor from Kansas.-
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point 1n the 
RECORD, as a part of my remarks, a radio 
commentary by Jack Jurey on February 
10, 1959, the evening of the announce-
ment of the leave of absence for the Sec-
retary of State. 
1'here being no objection. the state-
ment was ordered to be l>rint.cd 1n the 
REcoRD. as follows: 
Thla Ia Jnck Jurey with the WTOP com-
ment tor tonight. 
The neweat lllneu of Secretary ot Stat .. 
0\tllea should cause u.s all to Join President 
Elarnhow~ In extending beat wishes to thta 
dedlcl\tt'd omclal who, however much one 
may <llsagTee with his policies, has workt'd 
10 tlroleS$Iy on behalf of the United States. 
We IOD& ago loot track of the total mllenge 
log&ed by Mr Dulle• In hta peripatetic quest 
tor peace, or tbe number of &tops be baa 
ml\<le. or the numh<-r or omclata to whom ho 
hM talked In virtually all quarters of tho 
globe. 
But we <lo know this; that John Fos~r 
Dulles since 1953 has expended his energies 
and hanlth at a reckless rate, at a ttm" of 
life wh~n m06t of us would be resigned to 
settttna: down with pipe and sllpper8. &-
pt'CiaUy tlnce his operntton for cancer, he has 
<ll~playe<J an uncommon devotion to duty. 
Thla nt-wsman reo.qlls parttculnrly t Hit 
After his ncxt-to-lnst Illness, a bout with 
dlv<·rtlculltus. M.r. Dulles apologized to a 
nowa conference tor not having seen re-
porters for a period of several weeks. Such 
an apology was not only unusual In an 
administration which sometimes seems to 
Ulkl' a lacl<adnlslenl attitude toward news-
men, but "-'NI expre.o;,•lve or the lnner stutT 
of this unusually gifted man. In n•a.ny re· 
apecta he Is a f:\r better public servant than 
10me or his critics would ha,·e us believe. 
Speaking of cr1t1cs, It seems an appropriate 
time to mention that many Amerlcnns may 
noL comprehend what has happen~ In the 
last decade to the omce whlcb Mr. Dulles 
bolda. 
For well o\'er a c~>ntury and a hair, a Sec-
retftry of State Will, for the rn0$t part a 
Cabinet otllclal aub)ected only to compnra-
ttvely minor strAins. for the reason that the 
United St.,teo; consl<lert'd lt.selr (and "'as, 
for the mo.t part) a remote Island In the 
V83t aea o f tnternattonal troubles. ln the 
occulonal pt'rlod when tbe Nation was con-
frontec2 by brutal world realities. It was often 
tbo Pre-sident bl-lf who bore tbc brunt: 
Jcol!'erson, Madison. LI1\COin, Wilson, Frank-
lin Rooscvca. 
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The poet-World War II years, however , have 
seen an evolution ancl elevation or the Sec-
retary or State's duties, to the point where 
this single man. whether he be George Mar-
shall. Dean 4beson, or Dulles, has day-to-
day responslbllttles unparalleled In American 
history. 
The reason, or course, Is this country's re-
luctant emergence as a massive world power, 
with all the trials and tribulations that such 
a status Implies. The world struggle with 
communism, conducted on multidimen-
sional levels. Is enough to strain the strength. 
patience, and resource&- or an]t man, and 
certainly one who, like Secretary Dulles, must 
carry with him the burdens of advanced age 
d the demands ot an active Christian 
science. 
e are among those who believe that, on 
ion. Mr. Dulles has been mistaken. We 
er, tor example, that In some rest>eCts 
tailed to demonstrate the resiliency 
d that new clrcumstnnces demand, 
h this criticism does not, tor a mo-
eny the Intellectual quaiiOcatlons 
rings to his task. 
our res 
carries a 
o criticize, of course. could be 
ly history will tell. But the fact 
mur on o~caslon does not diminish 







r - ain his 
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g. on the door or West Berlin, 
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to his country. It would be 
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hop at Secretary Dullea 
k r peratlon and will be 
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THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr., Presldent. let 
me preface my remarks with this assur-
ance to the senate: I am not an alarmist. 
I measure most carefully the words I am 
about to speak. In that con~xt, I ex: 
press to the Senate my belief that just 
ahead lies the most critical period which 
the United States will have had to face 
since the contllct In Korea. 
The crisis, Mr. President, Is coming In 
Germany. Specifically, It Is coming In 
Berlin. Indeed, It may have already 
begun.. For years now, the -!>eeds of that 
crisis have lain dormant In a divided 
Germany. They have been held In 
check only by a kind of mutual acqules-
cense. The Western Powers have not 
wished to disturb the seeming stability In 
Germany. Since the Berlin blockade, 
the Soviet Union has not seriously 
threatened lt. A few years ago, upris-
Ings ot East Germans shook the stability, 
but did not break it. 
Those who have thought at all about 
the German situation have known for a 
long time that the surface calm would 
not last. The existence of two German 
authorities In what Is one Germany has 
been, from the end of World War II, a 
makeshift arrangement. The Western 
Powers have recogn.lzed it. The Soviet 
Union has acknowledged it. The Ger-
man leaders know it. 
The key question has never been, Will 
Germany be unified? The qUestion has 
long been, When and how will Germany 
be unified? Those of us who have urged 
an Initiative In American policy with re-
spect to Germany have been aware of 
this distinction. When I addressed my-
self to this subject in the Senate In May 
1958, I had the distinction very much in 
mind. Because I did, I tried to deal In 
the specifics of an American initiative. 
In suggesting, last May, alternatives to 
present policy, my thought was that 
when the status quo gave way, as surely 
It must, the changes ought at least to 
hold promise of leading to the strength-
ening of freedom In a peaceful Germany. 
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President wlll the 
senator from Montana yield to me? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Ml'. President, I 
am delighted to yield to my distinguished 
friend from Idaho. 
Mr. CHURCH. I wish to apologize 
for Interrupting so soon the remarks 
of the Senator from Montana, because I 
believe that the address he Is delivering 
will be a most significant one. But I 
wish to say that, characteristically, In 
his opening remarks the Senator from 
Montana has pierced to the nub of the 
Issue. Conditions In Germany are going 
to change. Germany will not Indefinitely 
remain divided against itself. Germany 
will not Indefinitely continue to be gar-
rl90ned by foreign troops. 
It seems to me that those who say our 
foreign policy must be Inflexible over-
look the fact that ow·s Is not a static 
world. 
Therefore. Mr. President. I think the 
Senator from Montana rendered us a 
service when, a year ago, he emphasized 
the fact that conditions in Germany 
would be changing. and that we must be 
prepared to face up to those changes If 
we are to cope effectively with them. 
Flexibility In our foreign policy Is a 
must. A steel blade bends. Pig iron 
breaks. , 
I wish to thank the Senator from Mon-
tana for coming forward at this stage 
In the developing Berlin crisis with a 
speech which will be helpful in giving 
guidance to all of us, to the President. 
and to the Secretary of State, in our 
common effort to solve that crisis for 
the benefit of the free world. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank my friend 
from Idaho. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President. at this 
point will the Senator from Montana 
yield briefly to me? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to 
yield. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. Prezldent, we have 
just-returned to this Chamber from a 
most Impressive joint session with the 
other body, In connection with the cele-
bration of the !50th anniversary of the 
birth of Abraham Lincoln. At the joint 
session, during a brllllant address by the 
great writer and poet. Carl Sandburg, he 
had occasion to quote a sentence from 
Abraham Lincoln, which I believe Is per-
tinent today in connection with the 
splendid address which my friend, the 
Senator from Montana, Is makl.ng on the 
German question. Lincoln said: 
The dogmas of the quiet pa.at are Inade-
quate for the stormy present. 
I wish to congratulate my friend, the 
Senator from Montana. tor the fine ad-
dress he Is making on the German prob-
lem. 
However. I would not be true to my-
self if I did not register a slight dissent 
from some of the comm~nts which have 
been made with respect to the Secretary 
of State. 
It is unpleasant and unrewarding to 
say unkind things about a man who is 
in physical pain, who has shown great 
physical courage, who is unquestionably 
a patriot. who is a man of great dedica-
tion to the public interest; but I would 
feel untrue to myself if I did not register 
on the fioor of the Senate a dissent to 
the statement that he is indispensable 
to the conduct of our foreign policy in 
the immediate future. I call attention 
to what I have said on other occasions 
with respect to this matter. 
I hope that these comments wilJ be 
taken in good part, and that it will be 
Wlderstood that I make them only be-
cause I cannot remain silent when it 
might be indicated that I was in accord 
with what has been said. 
I thank the Senator for yielding. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate what 
the distinguished Senator from Penn-
sylvania has just said. I commend him 
for his honesty and his integrity. Of 
course, I recognize that It is not a new 
viewpoint on his part. but that he has 
been consistent in his views in this re-
spect for some time. I would point out. 
however, that the immediate danger, as 
I see It, is the Berlin and the German 
situation. No one knows more about 
those situations at the present time or 
Is better prepared to lead the allies in 
meeting them than Is the Secretary 
of State. On that basis. as well as on 
other basis, I wish him well. I wish him 
a speedy recovery. I anticipate that in 
the not too distant future he wiJI resume 
his duties. and will act, not as his own 
agent, but as the agent of the President 
of the United States, in conducting for-
eign policy. 
Mr. CLARK. Obviously, I do not wish 
to engage in a colloquy of extended du-
ration with my colleague at this time. 
I should like to be recorded as very 
much hoping and praying for Mr. Dulles' 
Immediate recovery; but I cannot agree 
that there are not in the State Depart-
ment others as well or better qualified 
than the secretary to carry on the Ger-
man negotiations. I appreciate that this 
Is a situation on which the distinguished 
Senator from Montana and I disagree. 
I shall desist froni fw·ther comment on 
this particular phase. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall desist, also. 
Mr. President. I repeat, In suggesting, 
last May, alternatives to present policy, 
my thought was that when the status 
quo gave way, as surely it must. the 
changes ought at least to hold promise 
or leading to the strengthening of free-
dom in a peaceful Germany. 
We did nothing, Mr. President. We 
took no Initiative. We went on In the 
familiar vacuousness. in the familiar pat-
terns of policy patterns devised years 
ago, in another setting, under another 
administration. We did not face the 
fact that that policy was adequate to 
maintain a semblance of stability .in 
Germany only so long as all directly con-
cerned acquiesced in the continued divi-
sion of that nation. 
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That fs water under the bridge. We 
did not choose to act In a positive fash-
Ion to change the status quo. Now, the 
Russians have chosen to break lt. They 
have chosen to make the break at Berlin. 
They have said. In ettect, that, after the 
spring of 1959. the situation will no 
longer be as It has been In that city. 
They are quite right, Mr. President. 
Things will no longer be the same In Ber-
lin or anywhere In Germany. If there 
Is any certainty, It Is that the situation 
In Germany at the close of 1959 will be 
far different from the present situation. 
We are approaching the beginning or 
the end. the beginning of the end of two 
Berllns and of two Germanys. 
The question. as I have already ob-
served. was never. Would Germany be 
unified? It was, When and how would 
Germany be unltled? We may now have 
begun to comprehend the when; the 
actual process or unlftcatlon Is likely to 
begln this year. Only one question re-
mains: How Is Germany to be unified? 
Will It be by confilct, by negotiation, or 
by some mixture of the two? Thnt Is 
the question which Is lmpellins us and 
the rest o! the world toward the coming 
crisis In Germany. 
CONSTITUTIONAL II~PON~I'IILrri'U IN TJIC 
COWAN Clll•IS 
The resporulblllty for establishing 
binding foreign policies to deal with the 
impending crl~ls. the coming change In 
Germany. rests with the President and 
his Secretary of State. Let there be no 
doubt on that score, ln this body. at home. 
fn the executive branch, or abroad. It 
Is not for the Senate to direct the Presi-
dent In this matter. The President will 
have to make his own de<:l$lons, With 
the assistance of the vast resources or 
the executive branch. When he ~peaks 
officially on Germany. however. he will 
be speaking for all or WI, v.hether or not 
v.•e agree with what he says. There is 
no other way under the constitutional 
&ystem of the United States. 
To say that Is not to constrain upon 
the Senate a silence In these matters. 
On the contrary, since we ~hall be bound, 
since the people or the Umted States 
shall be bound, by what the President 
and his Secretary of State do or fall to 
do In the coming crl~ls. the obli"at10n or 
the Senate to debate. to discuss, and to 
advise Is real nnd It 1S compelling. 
The Senate of the 86th Congress v.·as 
not constituted so that It miRht Ignore 
pressing domestic questions. How much 
less then, can we remain Silent on the 
life-and-death mntters of foreign policy? 
The President 11nd the Secretary of State 
have given no Indication that they would 
have this body turn Its back on the cns!s 
fn Germany. On the contrary, I note 
that the Secretary of State has already 
soullht the counsel of the dtstlngulshed 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations !Mr. FULDRICIIT). I commend 
the Secretary for his Initiative. The 
bnlllant chairman or the committee has 
much to contribute to the development 
or policy for the situation In Germany. 
H the Senate Is to meet Its responsi-
bilities. Mr. President, we must form, 
throu~~:h debate and discussion. an under-
standing or the situation as It Is, and ns 
It is evolving in Germany. We musL also 
discern clearly the stakes of the people of 
the United States and of freedom In 
that situation. We must advance, fi-
nally, Ideas for consideration In formu-
lating the foreign policies which are to 
safeguard the vital Interests of our 
people. 
'Ihese are the thoughts which have led 
me to these remarks on the coming crlsts 
in Germany. I make them In the spirit 
of responsible Democratic cooperation 
with a Republican administration in a 
matter of vital concern to all the people 
ot the United States. 
TWO CERMA!Il AUTHORITIES IS ONJ. Cl:llMANT 
Let me begin by exploring the signifi-
cant realities In Germany, as I see them. 
The basic reality, Mr President, Is that 
there are two political authorities in one 
Germany. 1 hat Is a contradiction 
which cannot and will not stand. There 
Is one Germany. And there are com-
pelling historic and practical reasons 
which require that the unity ot that na-
tion begin to emerge without delay If 
there Is to be peace In Europe and In the 
world. 
I stress the point. Mr President, that 
when we speak of the two Germanles 
we are really speaklng not of two nations 
but of two political authorities. Each of 
these authorities presumes that It Is the 
wave or the future In all Germany. Each 
seeks to draw the v. hole of the Getman 
people Into Its orbit. 
To be sure. there are profound dlfYer-
ences betv.een the West Gt'rman govern-
ment in Bonn and the East German 
Communist regime In Pankow. The 
Bonn government is based upon prin-
ciples and practices of dl!mocracy v. hlch 
are consonant with those of other West-
ern nations and are expressly supperted 
by the Inhabitants of West Germany. 
The Pankow re1:1me exists by the meth-
ods of authoritananl•m which come from 
the East. Its source of authority lies In 
the w1ll to power of those who wield the 
authority and the acquiescence-how-
ever sullen-of the repressed people of 
East Germany. Its survival depends, to 
a far ~:renter dPr,ree than anytlum~ we 
know In the Weste1·n democraCit'S, on 
military and pollee power-Its own and 
the Soviet Unlon·s. 
The Wt'st German dl'mocratlc r.overn-
ment exists. It is there. at Bonn, and 
the Communists are not gom~r to v.lsh 1t 
away or subvert It away. It Is gomg to 
stay as long as the people In that zone 
sustain it and ns long ns the Western 
nations remain comm1tted to Its prot('c-
tion against military agsre~~lon from the 
East. We cannot Ignore the fact how-
ever. that the East German regime , I .o 
exists. It 1.:; there at Pankow. and Ger-
man commumsts run It, even thou h 
Russians may pull the strings from be-
hind the curtain. Unfortunately, I sec 
no evidence that the 'Vest ern nations are 
goinr to wish away or subvert away that 
East German political authonty In the 
practicable future. 
If neither side can be wished away, or 
subverted away, how then is the diVlslon 
or Germany going to be made to dis-
appear? How ls a unified Germany, 
this essential Germany, this Inevitable 
Germany. going to emerge? There was 
a time, perhaps, when It might have been 
reasonable to hope that the Russians and 
German Communists would soon find It 
too costly to maintain their control in 
Enst Germany. For years we have 
waited for this promised development. 
We have waited for the Russians and 
their campfollowers to fold their tents 
and steal away. 
What we must ask ourselves now is 
whether there Is any ree11stic basis for 
hoping that this development wUI come 
about m the practical'le future? I re-
gret to say that such public indications as 
there are suggest that the Pankow re-
gime, with Soviet support. is consolidat-
ln~~: Its position, that its authoritarian 
hold on Enst Germany Is, if anything, 
more secure today than it was a few 
years ago. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield for a question? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the 
lasL thought expressed, the Senator from 
Montana has stated that the authori-
tarian hold on East Germany is now 
greater than it was before. Will the 
Senator deal a little more in·detaU with 
that, and state whether the hold Is the 
result o! the power of the Communists, 
or whether it is the v. ill of the people that 
they be held by the Communists? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be de-
liGhted to try to answer my distinguished 
!ucnd from Ohio. I can say. of course, 
without equ1vocat1on that the pre~ent 
5tatus Is not the desire or the will of the 
people. 'I he source of my statement is 
the US. Nev.s & World Report, the issue 
of February 13. 1959. 
I read from page 67. at the bottom: 
E &t 0 rmnn~·s Communist government 
hils )un publl•hcd otrlclal figures on Its 
plnnncd exprndlturu tor 1959. 
Before I read further I wish to say 
that all the Information I have in my 
presentation has appeared ln the public 
prmt.. There is nothing secret or official 
about what I am saying, and It simply 
rt'l>re•ents one Senator's opinion as to 
what I think Is the most dtftlcult and 
dan~erous question of today. 
I continue with the quotation from 
the U.S. News & World Report: 
We t G~rmnn nnnnclnl experts, looking 
Into the Reds' figures. In tbe budget and 
out <·! lt. m nde n fttnrtllng discovery. 
Mllltnrv aprndll g by the East Germsn 
Reds In 1959 Is to be 30 percent higher thnn 
mlllt.nry apendlng planned by West Germany. 
Yet the Reds sa)· that West Gcrmnny 1a 
threMenlhg the JX:ICe ot the world. 
That Is what I mean when I say that 
the Pankow regime IS more secure, not 
In a political sense but in a military 
6eru;c. 1 hey have been strenRthemng 
thcmseh·es on a military and paramili-
tary basis. Of course. the 22 to 28 Soviet 
dtvls10ns are still m East Germany 
Mr. I.AUSCHE. I a"ree with the Sen-
ator. My mchnatJon would be to be-
lieve that the people of East Germany, 
If they hnd U1e opporturuty, would un-
shackle thPmselves of the hold which 
the Soviet has upon them. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is ab-
solutely correct. I have been told that 
the fl~ure would run ao; high as 95 to 96 
percent o! U1e East Germans who, if 
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they had the opportunity to vote, would 
vote against the present Ulbricht regime. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. But the fact is that 
the Soviets and those of East Berlin who 
agree with the Soviets are applying con-
stantly heavier pressure in the develop-
ment of the military? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
correct. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator 
very much. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is 
all very well to hope, as a general prin-
ciple, for the disappearance of totali-
tarianism. We have held tl'lat principle 
for decades. but we have also had to 
live In a world which has contained since 
Its beginning and st111 contains many 
totalitarian regimes. 
No, Mr. President, a valid policy on 
Germany, now, must be built on more 
than the hope of the eventual disappear-
ance of German totalitarianism. It can 
only be built on the premise that Ger-
many, In one way or another, Is going to 
unity and It Is going to begin to unity 
soon. Further, It can only be built on 
the permlse that that unity In Germany, 
It It Is to come In peace, Is likely to tall 
short of the ultimate goals set tor It by 
both the Communist nations and the tree 
nations-the goal, on the one hand, of a 
Communist totalitarian Germany. and 
the goal, on tl'le other, of a fully repre-
sentative democracy In all Germany. 
Until a few months ago there might 
have been a possibility of evading that 
reality for a while longer by assuming 
that the status QUO of division In Ger-
many might go on Indefinitely. But the 
prospect of evasion Is now narrowing 
rapidly In the wake of Mr. Khrushchev's 
announcement of tl1e coming Soviet 
withdrawal !rom Berlin. The blunt !act 
Is that soon either negotiations leading 
to German unification in peace shall be-
gin 1n earpest or there shall begin In 
earnest the use ot torc:e to that end. 
8EitLIN~HE COllE OF THlt CONING CRISIS 
This brings me to a second matter 
which we must explore, Mr. President, If 
we are to see our way clearly In the im-
pending crisis. That Is the question of 
Berlin. It Is at Berlin, divided Berlin. 
and along the wester~a routes of access to 
the city, that the first indications of the 
conflict leading to war or the success 
ot negotiations leading to stable peace 
are likely to appear In the comlng 
months. 
I shall not take the time of the Senate 
to review the historic circumstances sur-
rounding the present difficulties of the 
western position In Berlin. It Is simple 
enough to find fault with what was done 
or not done by political and military 
leaders years ago. It Is as easy, as It Is 
pompous. to pass angry judgments on 
others. with the prop of hindsight. That 
process will serve rto useful purpose in 
this situation. 
Nor shall! take the time ot the Senate 
to review the legal status of our position 
In Berlin. Some may find solace for our 
difficulties in legalism. Even the Rus-
sians sought justification for their ac-
tions In lt. But legalism is as best a 
dubious way to deal with an explosive 
situation, when there are, as there are in 
this situation, two opposing judges, two 
opposing judgments, and two opposing 
instruments of mass destruction for 
enforcing the judgments. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I wish the Senator 
from Montana would discuss in a little 
greater detail the element of legalism 
being Introduced. I have my own un-
derstanding of it. I think we are advo-
cating the proposition that there are 
certain legal obligations rooted In agree-
ments which we have made in the past, 
and that In making our demands we In-
sist upon adherence to those obllga tlons. 
Does the Senator mind discussing that 
question? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from 
Ohio Is correct. References have been 
made to the agreements made at Pots-
dam relative to the occupation of Berlin. 
References have been made to the 
agreement entered Into by Gen. Lucius 
Clay, at that time commander of our 
forces In Germany, with the Soviet au-
thorities. by means of which we were 
guaranteed by the Soviet authorities ac-
cess by rail, by road, and by air, from 
the western zones In Germany Into the 
western sectors of Berlin. 
Then, as I recall-and I believe the 
Senator will corroborate me on this-
some sort ot agreement was made by 
Mr. Phillip Jessup and a Russian repre-
sentative whose name I cannot recall 
at the moment, which agreement Mayor 
Willy Brandt brought to our attention 
at the luncheon held 1n the Foreign 
Relations committee room the other 
day. If I remember correctly, he stated 
that out ot these Jessup-Russian con-
sulto.tlons • nnd n.greementa, which 
brought an end to the need for the 
allied airlift into Berlin. also came an 
agreement that we be allowed contlnued 
access. He suggested that we look Into 
the agreement to which he referred as 
the agreement of 1949. Unfortunately 
I have not had an opportunity to do so 
yet. 
But there are these agreements, or al-
leged agreements. which give us the 
right to go in and to maintain access 
between the western zones and the west 
sector of Berlin. 
The Russians predicate their claims 
on similar agreements. which they say 
were made at Potsdam and elsewhere. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. It is the position of 
the Senator from Montana, then. that 
the PI'Oblem Is more Involved and far 
graver In its possible consequences to 
world peace than mere adherence to 
those agreements would justify. We 
must go beyond that. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
absolutely con-ect, because In my opin-
ion the potentials involved In this situ-
ation are teiTible and tremendous. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. It does not much 
matter now how we got to Berlin. or 
why the Russians have no legal right to 
ask us to leave. What does matter. Mr. 
President. is why we need to stay in Ber-
lin, as stay there -we must. We are, 
bluntly, in a highly difficult and danger-
ous position in Berlin. Great sacrifices 
may be entailed in remaining. We had 
better understand clearly now the 5ig-
nificance of maintaining our position 
there. We had better understand now 
what is vital and what is not vital in that 
position to the people of the Uniu:d 
States and to freedom. 
The administration has responded to 
the Ru56ian proposals on Berlin by re-
iterating a long-standing view of the Na-
tion. It has said, as the Democratic ad-
ministration before it said, that we will 
not be driven from the city. The posi-
tion of this Government, to stand firm in 
Berlin, has been endorsed by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is sup-
ported by Democrats and Republicans 
alike In the Senate. 
It Is a sound position. Only It is not 
enough. It is not enough to say, Mr. 
President, that we are standing fast In 
Berlin. That is a slogan, not a policy. 
Nor Is It enough, Mr. President, to stand 
fast merely to demonstrate our deter-
mination to maintain our legal Interpre-
tation of the situation as against the 
Soviet Union's. 
Nor is It enough to say that we stand 
fast In Berlin so that we may continue 
to demonstrate in the heart of Commu-
nist Germany the material superiority of 
freedom or free enterprise over Commu-
nist collectivism. To be sure, there Is a 
striking contrast between West Berlin 
and East Berlin, but I doubt very much 
that the people of the United States wlll 
countenahce the sacrifice of a single hu-
man li!e tor the purposes of propagan-
distic demonstrations In Berlin. And 
before this year Is out many lives may 
have been spent In Berlin. 
No, Mr. President, It Is not for rea-
sons ot legalism or propaganda that we 
stand fast in Berlin. The Western na-
tions are in Berlin because Berlin be-
longs neither to East Germany nor West 
Germany: it belongs to all the German 
people. We are In Berlin because some 
Germans may now look to Bonn and 
others to Pankow for leadership, but all 
Germans will soon look to Berlin. We 
are in Berlin to see to it that when that 
city is once again the capital of all Ger-
many, as It surely will be. the concept 
ot freedom In peace will not be absent 
from the scene. If that concept were to 
disappear from Berlin, the citadel of 
German nationalism. sooner or later it 
would disappear from all Germany. 
Then, sooner or later. the torch would be 
let In Ge1·many, whether by German 
hands or some others, to set Europe and 
the world aflame once again. That torch 
was lit twice In Berlln in the past. and 
twice th.e world has paid an enormous 
human price. To see that it is not lit 
again is m the essential. the vital inter-
est of this generation and future genera-
tions of the people of the United States. 
That. Ml'. President. is the reason 
which beyond all others. justifies the 
taking of the great risks which we may 
soon be called upon to take at Berlin and 
along the western routes to the city. 
We are in Berlin in order to get out. but 
to get out only on condition that the 
German political forces which stand for 
freedom In peace have a sure footing 
and equal chance to sunive and to grow 
on their merits in the future capital of 
all Germany. 
I support fully the position of this ad-
ministraLion on the ncccss tiy of standmg 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 40, Folder 14, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
2038 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE Februa1·y 12 
fast in Berlin. I question, however, the 
adequacy with which we have related 
that position to the changing situation in 
Germany. I question a policy which 
provides that not only do we stand fast in 
Berlin. but also implores or demands that 
the Russians stand fast. After years of 
trying to get the Russians out of the in-
numerable places Into which they 
swawled after World war II, it is indeed 
strange to hear that we are insisting that 
the Russians must not, Indeed, cannot, 
leave Berlin. That is a most peculial' 
position to say the least; and the Rus-
sians obviously have no Intention of 
obliging us by remaining. 
It Is clear what Is afoot there. In a 
few months hence. the Russians will 
leave East Berlin despite our demands Ol' 
urgings to the contrary. East Berlin will 
then be. once again, a German city-
Communist, to be sure-but nevertheless 
German. By contrast, West Berlin will 
retain the appearance It now has, the 
appearance of a Western enclave In the 
heart of Germany, for there nrc thou-
aands of Allied officials and military per-
sonnel In the area. The contrast will not 
be lost on German nationalists In East 
or West Germany. 
Furthet·, Mr. President, If we are to 
hold this enclave without struaale, It will 
be at the sufferance of the East Ge1·man 
Communist authorities. It they do not 
choose to accommcx:latc us, then we shall 
In all probability have to fight ou1· way 
through to Berlin, not against Russians, 
but against Germans. Even If this 
course does not lend to a great confilct, 
the repercussions In Germany will be 
profound. Among Germans, as amon'l 
others, blood may prove thicker than 
Ideologies. 
As I said, there can be no quarrel with 
the need to stand fast In Berlin. I do 
question. however. a policy which does 
not anticipate the developments whtch I 
have just outlined and falls to take steps 
to miL!gate them. 
I question. too. a policy which presumes 
as our policy does that the Great Powers 
of World War II-the Soviet Umon, the 
United Km!!dom. France. and the United 
States-can brinl! about German umfica-
Uon. There may have been a time when 
such a course was possible. If it ever 
existed, however, 1t was yrors ago wheo 
Germany lay devastated and prostrate. 
It was years llgo. in the frcshne:o;s of the 
common sacrifices of World War II and m 
the measure of mutual re~pect and toler-
ance which these sacrifices engendered. 
Those years are ~one. The t1mc is not 
today. 'Today, there is little respect be-
tween this Nation and the Soviet Un1on 
except the fearful respect which the mil-
itary PO\\er of the one may generate in 
the other. Today, Germany is nc1ther 
devastated nor prostrate: it has become 
once again the most dynamic nat1on m 
Western Europe. 
No. Mr. Prc~<ident. the erstwhile Allies, 
the divided Allies of World War II. are 
not in a position to ordain a unification 
in peace for a revttali7cd Germany. At 
most, they may be able to contribute to 
that unification by rethinkinP, their own 
security needs In anticipatiOn of its In-
evitable development. At most. they 
may be able to contribute to unification 
by exercising such influence as they may 
possess to encourage the Germans them-
selves to reach a reasonable procedure 
on unification and by sanctioning that 
procedure If It Is sound. It Is the Ger-
mans. themselves, however, who will 
make the decisive decisions on unifica-
tion, !! they are to be made in peace. 
FR&E ALL-GER~IAN ELECTIONS 
Further, Mr. President, I question. In 
present clrcum~tanccs, a policy which 
presumes to lead to the peaceful unifica-
tion of Germany solely en the basis o! 
free, all-German elections. I say now 
what I said last May on this point, only 
with more cm1:!:as1s. Events have moved 
a long way since thl:s policy was devised 
and the bell no lonrtcr has an alto('ether 
recognizable sound when It Is rung ovct· 
and over again In the same fashion. A 
G~rmnn political authority has emerged 
In the West. Another pollt!cal structure 
has appeared In the East which Is 
manned by Germans, even It It Is not 
directed by them. Whatever we may 
think of this structure, there Is no re-
liable Indication that It Is going to go 
away peacefully, o! Its own accord. 
There arc now military and para-
military German forces In both East and 
West Germany, How arc these !otces to 
be Integrated In peace? Is this a prob-
lem that can be solved by free, all-
German elections, at least without exten-
sive preparations by the G:'!rmans who 
officer these opposing forces? 
There are d!ITerlng economic and social 
structures functioning In Western and 
Eastern Germany. How arc these struc-
tures to be !used In peace? Can they 
be harmonized by free, all-German elec-
tions, at least without extensive prepara-
tions by those Germans who operate 
them? 
I cite these problems as examples. 
There are no doubt others of a similar 
nature A policy wh.ch ad\'anccs no 
thour:ht on how they are to be met docs 
not ber,in to meet the realities of the 
German situation. If the unification of 
G~rmany i:. essential and inevttablc and 
if it is neither our responsibility nor in 
the Interest of this Nation to seck that 
unity by force, then I submit that a policy 
which merely clings to an unrealizable 
slo~an of free all-German elections, 
which docs not pur~ue German unifica-
tion by other means. I~ no policy at all. 
It Is a straitjacket. IL is an excuse for 
immobility. It may well lead down the 
blind alley of an unnecessary confiici. 
or disastrous diplomatic retreat. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. 1\lr. President, will 
the Senator yll'ld? 
l\Ir. MAN!::FIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I take 1t. from what 
the Senator has stated, that the ciTOI'tS 
to procure an overall election of citizens 
of E.1st and West Germany have thus 
far proved to be futile. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
correct 
Mr. LAUSCHE. The East Germans 
will not con~ent to have an election un-
der \1 hich their people can give expres-
sion to the type of government they 
want. Based upon the fact that that 
objective is an unre:altzable objective. an 
overall free election, the Senator from 
Montana sugcests that other means 
should be explored to procure a solution 
of the problem. I wish the Senator 
would comment on that point. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I believe that the 
position of the Western Powers on the 
question of all-German elections Is one 
which stands no possibility In the Imme-
diate future, and perhaps In the indefi-
nite future, of achieving any degree of 
success. Therefore we should try to 
work out othor means. 
As I shall Indicate In the course of 
my speech, there are contacts In exist-
ence between the East German Govern-
ment and the West German Govern-
ment. 'These contacts are made on an 
interzonal basis, and are tied up with 
commercial Intercourse and trade com-
mttments. I would hope that In con-
sidering the Idea o! elections, we might 
be able to explore, perhaps, Ideas other 
than all-German elections, even though 
they arc the most desirable, and I should 
like to see them come to pass, and we 
might try to break It down-and the 
sooner the better-so that the East Ger-
mans could express themselves at the 
polls, perhaps just In East Germany, 
and declare to the world where they 
want to go. In that way they might get 
out from under the yoke the Ulbricht 
government, which Is exercising despotic 
and complete control over 17 m1ll!on 
Germans In East Germany. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator from 
Montana clarifies my mind on the sub-
ject. In other words, all o! us want a 
!ree election under which the people 
themselves would decide the type of gov-
ernment they de~ire to have. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. However, every ef-
fort In that direction has been rebutTed, 
and it Is therefore necessary to find other 
means of tryint:: to reach an agreement. 
Mr. MANSF.ELD. That Is the idea. 
The Senator Is correct. Every effort to 
achieve an all-German election has 
failed because of the Insistent and dog-
matic "nyet" af the S:>viet Union. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. SPi\RKMAN. Do I understand 
correctly the position of the Senator 
from ;>vtontana to be that, while he ad-
heres to what we have advocated so 
lonf1' that is. free elections for all of 
Gcrmarly, :>nd the idea of a unified Ger-
many, he recognizes the very practical 
difficulty of having that under present 
conditions? Therefore he says that per-
haps we ou~ht to make ourselves more 
flexible and st:~rt exploring some other 
way, and that there might be held a 
separate election in East Germany ·1d 
a sC'paratc election in West Germ~toy, 
and thus perhaps there could be agree-
ment upon some kind of independent 
government in each of the two areas, 
wtth the Idea that eventually, as he says, 
because blood is thicker than water, with 
teamwork the two temporary Germanys 
will combine themselves Into one overall 
united Germany some time in the future, 
even though we know not how far in 
the future. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The purpose of my 
speech today Is to suggest, respectfully 
and constructively, some possible altern-
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atlve which may be of value to the De· 
partment of State, or out of which may 
come Ideas which would be worthwhile 
toward the bringing about of a solution 
to this most dl.ftlcult problem. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to 
propound a question to the Senator !rom 
Montana. He spoke about the rigidity 
of our position In the past. Undoubtedly 
It has been rather rigid, so rigid that 
perhaps our country, as well as a great 
part or the world, was rather shocked 
recently when Secretary Dulles sunested 
there might be more tlexlblllty than we 
have given to the Idea, and whe~ he 
suggested there might be methods other 
than free elections for the solution of 
the problem. Is It not true, and would 
not the Senator aaree with me In this, 
that perhaps we have overslmplltled the 
matter In assumlna that a reunification 
could be easily brouaht about betweell 
the two Germanys? 
I may say that about 3 years ago I had 
the pleasure or attending an Interna-
tional conference at Garmlsch In Ger· 
many, The conference was made up or 
people from all the NATO countries, rep· 
resentatlves of governments, ot!lclals, 
buslneM people, economists, members of 
Parliament, and so on, and one of the 
German Ministers with whom I had quite 
a long talk made the point to me, the 
drst time I had ever heard It mentioned, 
that reun11lcatlon Is not a simple mat. 
ter. A1s hu been pointed out by the 
Senator from Montana. It might have 
been a relatively simple matter several 
years ago, right after the war. But 
since that time the two Germanles have 
grown away from the condition:! which 
the Senator has so well de.<;crlbed In h1s 
speech. They have grown away from 
some of the Incentives which might have 
pushed them together. 
Furthermore. dl.trerent enactments 
have taken place. For Instance. the 
Minister of the Bonn government said 
to me, "This may sound strange, com-
Ing from me, but East Germany has a 
social security system which In many 
respects Is better than ours." 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I t also antedates 
our own. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Although I 
was speaking of the social secunty of 
West Germany, It Is also true that the1rs 
antedates ours, too. 
East Germany has a system which Is 
1n many respects better than that In 
West Germany, so the East Germans 
could not be asked to give up their sys-
tem of social security, workmen·s com-
pensation, and land reform. 
The Senator !rom Montana, I believe. 
heard me ask the mayor of West Berlin 
the other daY. that very question, and he 
heard the mayor's comments. to the er • 
feet that to bring the two Germanles 
together, whenever It may be done, will 
necessitate the resolving of differences 
and the makln~; of allowances between 
the two governments. As I understand, 
that Is exactly what the Senator is talk-
Ing about. He Is speaking of the neces-
sity on the part of those concerned to 
be ready to consider and to negotlate 
with reference to all the changes which 
have taken place throughout the years. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is cor· 
rect. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I commend the 
Senator from Montana for making this 
very able speech and calling to our atten-
tion a matter which l8 not only of tre-
mendous Importance but also of great 
timeliness. After all, the ultimatum wlll 
expire on May 28, which Is not far oft. 
It has been suggested since the ulti-
matum was made that perhaps there will 
not be absolute adherence to that exact 
date. Nevertheless, we are approaching 
the day when Russia will leave Berlin. 
I think the Senator Is correct In saying 
that. Russia will leave, and that the 
United States will be placed In a rather 
ridiculous position It we try to keep Rus-
sia there, when, as a matter of fact, we 
have been saying to the world for many 
years that she should get out of the 
dlt'terent countries which she occupies. 
Mr . MANSFIELD. A1s a matter of 
fact, the Soviet Union has already with-
drawn some of Its troops and a consid-
erable number of the dependents of those 
troops. So It does not appear that Rus-
sia was fooling. when It delivered Its ulti-
matum. I hope that the United States 
will do, as I feel certain we are doing, 
everything possible to develop alterna· 
tlves and to consider ways and means 
to meet the situation. It and when It 
arises, when the deadline occurs, as the 
Senator from Alabama has pointed out, 
on May 27. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I think the Senator 
from Montana Is exactly correct. Cer. 
talnly we should be exploring all the 
alternatives. I think the Senator will 
agree with me that we ought not simply, 
easily, and QUickly reject any proposal 
wh1ch Is made, but. that we should be 
willing to let the world know that we are 
Willing to sit dov:n and negotiate con-
cerning every proposal which may come 
from either side. 
Mr . . MANSFIELD. Yes. I hope both 
the Soviet Union and the United Stal<'s 
will get away from the automatic re-
actions of the proposals which one coun-
try makes to the other. Usually the 
answer Is an automatiC ··No" Once In 
a while a "maybe" or a. "perhaps" and 
occasionally a. "yes" would be useful. I 
think In that way we m!Rht begin, at 
least on the marginal level, to do away 
with some of the differences. If we can 
do that, perhaps we can work our wny 
upward to an eventual solution or the 
bl~ger problems. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. The other day, In the 
talk with the mayor of West Berlin, I 
v·'\S greatly encouraged by his rea!;on-
auleness In wantmR to explore every 
avenue which m1ght lend us out or dark· 
ness into the li11ht and to an assured 
pe-ace for those people. May I ask the 
Senator from Montana If he has !liven 
any consideratiOn to the ability or the 
Soviet Union, after It has once with-
drawn Its troops, to jump In again be-
cause or Its closeness to this area or 
East Berlin? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have, Indeed. It 
the Senator will bear with me, I shall 
discuss that subject brlefty when I come 
to the ninth point In my recommenda-
tion. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator 
from Montana. 
JJ.Ill.ITARY WITHDRAWAL IN CERMANY AND 
CENTRAL EVIIOP£ 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, Mr. Pres!· 
dent, I question a policy which appears 
to regard as sacrosanct present military 
arrangements in Germany and Central 
Europe. I can understand, I can accept, 
I can support the concept that Western 
Germany's ties with Western Europe are 
essential to the peace of Europe and they 
must not be broken. Within that con-
cept, however, I cannot comprehend a 
view which seems to hold tnnexlbly to 
the present form and extent of German 
rearmament. We have accepted and 
even encouraged rises In the German 
military contribution to NATO In certain 
circumstances In the past. I do not see 
that we can.lot accept and encourage 
decllne,s In that contribution In other 
circumstances In the future. 
Security needs are ever-changlnr 
needs. Western German rearmament Is 
not an end In Itself. It Is for the pur· 
pose o! the defense of German freedom 
In common with the defense o! the free-
dom of the Western community. It Is 
not for the purpose of keeping rigid the 
tables of organization and the projec-
tions of presumed needs by the military 
command of NATO. The6e projections, 
In any event, ha.ve not been met for 
years and the world has not yet come to 
an end. 
The nature and extent o! German re-
armament and of non-German arma-
ments on German soil, In short, is one 
area or the problem of umncation in 
which reasonable proposals for negotia· 
tlon. wherever they may origmate, 
oucht not to be rejected out of h:t'hd. 
That Is especially the case if these pro-
posals are related to the reduction of 
military power throughOut Central 
Europe. I know full well that the Rus-
sians may have no intention of with-
drawing from the Eastern European 
Stales m any circumstances. Neverthe-
le!;S, I can see no reason to make It 
easier for them to justify their remain-
Ing by a seeming intransigence on our 
part. I cannot see that the road to the 
evE'ntual freedom of states like Poland 
and Czechoslovakia is made easier by 
such n process. 
IWSSIAN ROL£ IN TlU: COMINC CRISIS 
Mr. President, let me turn now to the 
que!:tlon of Russian intentions in the 
commg crisis In Germany. In this mat-
l<'r there is only one certain course. 
Whatever they may do. we must assume 
that the Russians are acting to enhance 
the pos1t1on of the Soviet Union and that 
of totalitarian communism throughout 
Germany and Europe. We must also as-
sume that they w1ll use whatever meth-
ods they believe will lead to these ends, 
not excluding l\((IUessive war. The Rus-
Sians may blow hot or they may blow 
cold. They may down a plane on their 
border one dny. They may release a 
blocked convoy the next. We cannot 
know with certainty why they act as they 
act a.t. any given moment. 
We cannot know w1th certainty the 
purport of Mr. M1koyan·s recent visit to 
the United States. We cannot know with 
C<'r talnty the meaning of Mr. Khru· 
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shchev's comments on a thaw In the cold 
war. They m..ny be meant to provide a 
~ett1ng for successful ne1totlat1ons. They 
may be meant simply to confuse or be-
guile. 
I! they do confuse. I! they do beguile, 
however, we shall have no one to blame 
but ourselves. We ought to be able by 
this time. years after the 111-!ated Gene-
va Conference of 1955, to dlstlneulsh 
between the conciliatory eesture and the 
act of conciliation. Those of us who 
come from the cold country have learned 
throueh bitter experience that winter 
thaws can be followed by summer frosts. 
The promise of sprlne In February Is not 
the same as the comlne of spring In May. 
There Is, as I say, no way of knowing 
with certainty what some particular So-
viet eesture or other slenlt\es. What we 
can know, Mr. President, Is that they are 
all, JOOd or bad, peripheral to the crisis 
which Is comlne In Germany. Mr. Ml-
ll:oyan'a vlalt Ia not JOin&" to free ua from 
that crisis. Mr. Khrushchev's thaws wUI 
not do it. Increased Soviet-American 
t rade has little 1·e1at1on to lt. 
It we are to be prepared to face this 
erlsla In Germany It will be best not to 
become distracted or obsessed by the 
twists and turns of Soviet behavior. It 
•·Ill be best to keep our eyes on Germany 
The fundamental question of policy for 
ua Is not so much v•hat the Russians are 
looklnlr for In Germany. We know what 
they are looklne for: and they may very 
well seize It \\hlle v•e amuse or fascinate 
ourselves by trylne to Interpret the 
charades of Russian behavior. 
No, Mr. President: more Important, far 
more Important, to us Is to lcnow what 
we ourselves are seeklnJ In Germany, 
We must bring to this crisis not only 
courage, but also conviction. We must 
bring to It a posltl\'e and understandable 
policy which meets our essential national 
needs and the essential needs o! freedom. 
nu ESSZ:NTlAUI or A WlCSH11N POLICY IN TJlC 
COMI!<O ClliSIS 
As I noted earlier In my remarks. It 
Is not !or Lhe Senate to direct the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Stat.c In the 
conduct of the forei gn relations of the 
United Stales. Dut il Is a responsibility 
of Senators to try to contribute con-
structively-and I whh to repeat the 
word •·construcllvely"-Lo the policle~ 
which govern those relations. It Is m 
that sense, Mr. President, that I seck, In 
these final comml'nts, to express the 
thought~ which this exploration sug-
gest.s-thOU"hts on the essentials or a 
sound We~tern policy !or the coming 
crisis In Germany. I have no crystal 
ball. I have no Se<'ret mformatlon. I 
have not been coach<'d by anyone. nor 
have I been a•ked by anyone to deliver 
this speech. What I suggest may not be 
valid In the light of the greater under-
standing of others. It Is one Senator's 
v1ews, based upon what he has rend, 
what he has h<'ard, what he has tried to 
reason . H is, In short, the course which 
su"gests Itself to me on the basis of the 
understanding which I have been able to 
draw out o! the confusion and complex-
Ity of the German situation. I can be-
and may well be-wrong: and I stand 
ready to accept a better Illumination of 
the problem through discussion and de-
bate In the Senate. For whatever they 
may be worth, however, I outline the fol-
lowing points as essentials of e. sound. 
w estern policy on Germany. 
First. It Is essential, Mr. President. 
that forces representing the concept of 
freedom In peace not be driven out or 
Berlin. They need, at the least, to re-
main on a basis of equality with the 
forces of totalitarian communism In the 
future capital of Germany, It those 
forces are to have a chance to remain in 
peace, a western Initiative for peace Is 
essential. 
Second. It is time to call upon German 
leaders of the two Berlin communities--
East and West-to begin serious etforts to 
unify the municipal eovernment and 
public services of that city. 
Third. To that end, Mr. President, It 
would be help!ul to enlist the concilia-
tory services of the Secretary General 
of the United Natlon.t. It aereement 
can be reached by East Germany and 
West Germany to establish an all-Berlin 
government, then It will be desirable to 
replace both Soviet and Allied forces 
with a United Nations Interim pollee 
force composed of contlneents !rom na-
tions not directly ln\'olved. That force 
mleht aupervl!e the aereement, and 
mleht see to It that all the routes of 
access to the city remain open until Ber-
lin once aealn becomes the capltnl of a. 
peaceful, unlfled Germany. It may be 
that In the B:!rlin microcosm there may 
evolve patterns of unification which will 
be applicable to the laree1· problem of 
all-German unlf\catlon. 
Fourth I! this approach or some such 
approach to a unified. neutrnU7ed ~rlln 
falls, Mr. President, then it Is eEsentlal 
that the forces representing the concept 
of freedom in peace In Berlin remnln In 
Berlin, regardless o! whether the Rus-
sians leave. Let them go, I! they will. I 
would not wish to see this country a party 
to any Insistence that they stay. 
Fifth. At the same time. however, the 
forces representing freedom In Berlin 
must be Germanized liS rapidly liS pos-
Sible. It ls time to think seriously of 
replacing the thousands or allied mili-
tary personnel In Berlin with German 
m1ht1a, fully support.cd by NATO guar-
antees. 
Sixth. Some mny regard discussions 
between Germans of the West nnd Ger-
mans of the Ea~t as tantamount to recog-
nition of the East German Communist 
regime. Some who re~~:ard a.:. appease-
ment not only talk, but even thou ht, 
which apparently Is allen to them, on the 
senous problems of the Nat1on, may e\'en 
go so far as to label with this stamp of 
political chicanery any propo~al. of 
meetmgs between East and West G r-
mans. Let them do it, Mr. Pre•ldcnt, It 
Is their privileGe. 
But let me say this: U talk constitutes 
recognition or appeasement, then we 
have appeased and reco~nized Commu-
nist China, because a representative of 
this Government has been talking on Its 
behalf, on and orr. for years, w1th a Chi-
nese Communist representative In Gen-
eva and WarSI\w. If talk constltut.('S 
recognition or appeasement, then the 
West Germans have recognl?.ed and ap-
peased Pankow for years. The fact l.s 
that East Gcl'mans and West Gctmans 
have worked out practical agreements of 
various kinds between the two zones of 
Germany. A1; early as 1957, West Ger-
many's exports to East Germany fot the 
year totaled $201 million. During the 
first half or 1958, $125 mllllon in trade 
moved In each direction. That kind of 
trade, Mr. President, does not take place 
without talk. 
I do not know what the theory of 
lntematlonal la.w may be. I do not 
know whether talk Is tantamount to rec-
oenltlon. I do know that, as a practical 
matter, we have talked with, but have 
not recognized, Ccmmunlst China.. West 
Germans have talked with and traded 
with, but have not recognized, Pankow. 
What Is Involved in the coming crisis in 
Germany Is not a classroom problem on 
the theory of International law. It Is 
the life or death problem of peace or 
war. The stake Is the lives of tens of 
millions of humo.n beings, Americans 
included. 
I ce.nnot see that there Is going to be 
any peaceful solution of this problem 
without a ereat deal of talk-between 
Germans who are in authority in the 
Federal Republic and Germana who pur-
port to be In authority In the Eastern 
zone. It aeerrus to me essential, more-
over. that this talk cover the whole range 
or problems of unification or the two 
zones, the whole range of problems In-
volving the nllrmonizlng of the political, 
economic, and milltary systems of the 
two zones. 
Seventh. There Is a point beyond 
\\'hlch the search for peace can lead to 
the Jeopardizing of freedcm. Regard-
l~><~s of whlltever agreements emerge, it 
seems to me essential that the people or 
East Germany have ~orne genuine choice 
In the form of control which Is exercised. 
over them. There must be provision for 
the protect!nn of the rights or all peace-
ful political forces In aU Germany. All-
German elections ma.y not bt.. essential-
although I think them highly desirable-
but at least there must be a chance for 
men and women of Eastern Germany, as 
well as those of Western Germany, to ex-
press themselves and their political pref-
erences and to participate In political 
n.Oalrs without the threat of terror. 
Whatever may be the details of the 
fusion of the two zones, they are best 
left to the G:!rmans of the two zones. 
The Gcrm..nns are likely to know better 
th:m anyone else what will suit them and 
what L~ possible among them. Further-
more. It is Inconceivable that at this late 
dat.c the erstwhile allies of World War II 
can work out these details on the1r 
behalf. 
Eighth. The contribution which the 
Westem allies, as well as the Soviet 
Un1on, need to make, lf there is to be 
pen.ce. Is to guarantee, for a period of 
tlmc. the kind of unified Germany which 
m..ny emerge from discll!:sions among the 
G~rmans. What the former allies need 
to do Is to see to It that a unified Ger-
many neither 1s subjected to military 
pressures from its neighbors, nor be-
comes a source of military pressure to 
its nelrthbors. 
Ninth. To th11t end, Mr. President, it 
Is essential to Include within the scope 
o! ow· policy the search for agreements 
which, while they clo not compel a sever-
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ance of West Germany's nwnerous ties 
with western Europe, may lead to limi-
tations of armaments throughout Ger-
many a.nd central Europe. Also needed 
are agreements which will pull back the 
so-called ultimate weapons and the 
armed forces of both East a.nd West 
from the points of imminent contact In 
Germany and In central Europe. In 
short, Mr. President, it seems to me 
essential that our policy, NATO's poli-
cies, do not exclude a careful considera-
tion of the Rapackl Plan, the Eden Plan 
tor a demilitarized zone In middle 
Europe, or similar proposals In connec-
tion with the unification of Germany. 
Perhaps the best way to consider these 
matters would be to predicate them'on 
reasonable agreements which may 
emerge from the Geneva Conferences on 
Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of 
Nuclear Tests. 
Nqw getting back to what thP. distln-
gul.shed senior Senator !rom Ohio [Mr. 
LAuscH£] mentioned a while ago. he 
a.sked, I believe, If I recognized the sig-
nl.ftcance of a pullback :md how It would 
benefit the Soviet Union. I do reco~nize 
that In some kinds of pullback the West-
em Powers would receive the worst of 
it, but I think we ought to recognize 
also that 1! there Is to be any possib1llty 
of peace, we shall have to make some 
concessions; this might be one or them. 
We need to recognize that In so doing, It 
a withdrawal based on a reasonable 
solution were brought about, we woUld 
be the ones who would take a loss In 
position, since the Soviet divisions, In go-
ing ba.ck to the heartltmd, would be in 
striking distance and would be better 
prepared than we would be to carry on 
any m!Utnl"}' activity In that area. Dut 
we have to develop give and tnke.t by 
starting from the r>ottom and wor~lng 
upward. If we do not get out or the 
position or rigidity, I b~lleve the situa-
tion In Berlin and In Germany w!ll be-
come worse. and the bases on which 
there «tP,n be peace will become fewer 
and r\!wer 
Mrr LA', SCH:e. Mr President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Ohio. 
Mr. LAUSCHE I agree with the 
statement of the. Scnntor. In my opin-
Ion, there is a conditiOn existing tn 
which, 1t the Soviet ~vernment con-
tinues to dictate to the govemmint of 
East Berlin. It will be Impossible to bring 
about a reconciliation of E.'lSt and West 
Berlin. Sov1et Russia w11l not tolerate 
it. Ba.sed upon the adamant pos1tion 
of Soviet Russia. and ba.~ed upon the 
rigiditY of the s1tuallon as descnbed by 
the Senator from Montana, while the 
matters about which I have ~poken are 
highly desirable, I Soiree we should look 
for other avenues to e~cape the great 
holocaust which seems to be threaten-
ing us In the future. I. for one-and I 
believe conlinnatlon has been given t<> 
this view by the mayor or West Berlin-
would want every avenue explored, talks 
hud, continued talks, In the hope that 
1i0me solution may be found. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator 1.s 
correct. 
No.24--6 
Mr. President, I have taken a great 
deal o! the Senate's time today. I have 
tried not to take It lightly. I have done 
so because it Is clear ·that this adminis-
tration, following the example of Its pre-
decessor, has committed the Nation. to 
stand fast at Berlin. 
It Is a resolve well taken. Since we 
cannot yet perceive to what extremity 
of sacrifice It may lead In the months 
ahead, I have felt It essential to try 
to set forth for the consideration of the 
Senate my understandin~ of what Is In-
volved In the coming crisis In Germany. 
I am grateful that in this crucial time 
the Senate's pricipal member In these 
matters, the outstanding Senator from 
Arkansas !Mr. FuLaRICHT) Is a man with 
such a deep understanding and intelli-
gent grasp o! the international forces 
that play on the Nation. I hope that he 
will make his voice heard: I am sure 
that the President and the Secretary o! 
State will listen most carefully. I 
would hope, further, that between them 
will evolve a policy that all of us, as 
Americans, will be glad to support. 
Most important, Mr. President, I hope 
that the President of the United States, 
his Secretary of State, and the Congress 
will fortify the resolve to stand fast in 
Berlin with the conviction v. hlch only 
a positive policy for peace can g1ve 1t. 
The Secretary o! State ha.s spoken or 
mutual concessions. Those are calm and 
wise words for this moment m t1mc. with 
the clouds of radioactive death waiting 
to envelope the earth. I hope, deeply, 
that they w1ll lead to n pos1t!ve policy 
for peace. It is th~t kind of a policy 
for wh1ch rational men everywhere arc 
wa1tmg. It IS that kmd of a policy 
wh1ch they w1ll be able to compr(·hend 
and to which. lf need tx-. tht'Y w11l be 
able w1Umgly to consecrate their lives. 
The policy has yet to be formed. It 
needs to be formed soon. If It is 
formed, the concept of freedom in peace 
will not perish in Berlin, m Germany, 
or in the world. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator y1eld? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. It has been 
a treat to be privileged to hear an excel-
lent speech, such as a the one which 
has just been concluded by a great man. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana has made many contnbut1ons to 
the cause of peace In the world, but 
none more important than hi!! forceful 
statement today. Alw1n·s responsible. 
alwars constructive, we his collem:ues in 
the Senate talte great pride m scrvmG 
w1th him. 
On behalt of the State l':hlch 1 repre-
sent. I w1sh to say to the State from 
which he comes that the world 1s n bet-
ter world because of Milt£ M,.:-;SFIF.LD, 
and that the suggestions he has made 
today, predicated upon the great phi-
losophy of Isaiah's advice, "Come now, 
let us reason together," should be heard 
around the world. 
I thank the Senator for his construc-
tive contribution. I feel very humble 
to be able to sit In his pre~ence. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Texas. 
Mr. President. I yield the noor. 
Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was 
given a copy of the fine address which 
the distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana delivered today. I read It, and I 
have heard part of the address today. 
I agree very much with the very fine 
encomium paid by the distinguished ma-
jority leader to the S~nator from Mon-
tana. As many folks have said, "MIKE 
M":-osnELo is a real guy." I agree with 
that statement. 
I can a~rec with much the Senator 
from Montana has stated. I particu-
larly agree about the need for us In this 
Chamber to discuss responsibly and con-
structively not only foreign policies but 
also all measures in that manner. Full 
and free debate was and is an essential 
element of a bipartisan approach. 
I wish to say to the very able Senator, 
there Is no need for the Senator to re-
assure the Senate regarding his serious 
purpose and his careful choice of words. 
I and my colleagues on this side of the 
aisle always are conildent the Senator 
will give sober, Intelligent and construc-
tive addresses on any subject, foreign 
policy or anything else. He is "that sort 
ot guy," as someone has said. The Sena-
tor has set high standards for himseH, 
and I congratulate him. 
I should like to record my agreement 
with the Senator concerning the serious-
ness of the Berlin situation and the need 
for all of us to maintain open minds :md 
the utmost of fiexib1l.ty, in considerir.g 
possible avenues for a possible resolu tion 
of the problem, in accord with the free 
world mterest. Indeed. I think we have 
ben g1ven a sound account of the back-
ground of the situation in Germany. as 
well as a number of clucs-I hesitate to 
call them all essentials-to\,ard fimling 
the peaceful solution we seek. 
liO\\ ever. I should also like to state my 
behef that at least two main elcm·'nts 
m the current G~rman scene have been 
barely mentioned in my colleague's not-
able speech. 
The first missing ingredient concerns 
the past and continuing requirement 
that the United States consult with and 
move In concert with its allies, espec1ally 
f'rnnce, Great Britain, and West Ger-
many. There is no question that the 
Sov1et Union, acting only In Its own in-
terests. in the very nature of thin~~:s has 
been able to represent itself as ostens!bly 
more flexible than the West in propa-
ganda and diplomatic approaches to 
central European problems. 
We must remember that the We ,t 
German Government itself has been a 
foremost exponent of firmness in dealin~ 
with the U.S S.R. This point gains in 
Importance when v.·e recall the re:narks 
made by the Senator about the unific:~­
Uon question bem!1! one for action by the 
Germans themselves. 
\Ve know who holds the strings in Ea~t 
Germany. We know who ccntro!s r:~.st 
Germany \!\'e might as well look that 
fact in the face. They not only control 
E<\St Germany, but they also control 
CZechoslovakia, Bul~aria, Romania. and 
all the Baltic States. It is not a ques-
tion ot the F.ast Germans and the West 
Germans getting together. 
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We were told the other day by Willy 
Brandt, a statesman, which was con-
firmed to me personally by Mr. Ade-
naur, that If the East Germans had their 
own way 95 percent of them would join 
with the West. 
In fact, I could not help feeling that 
the address of my distinguished colleague 
had a slight tone in It which was hard 
to under6tand. The Senator seemed to 
alternate back and forth between giving 
us and the Germans primary responsi-
bility for taking the initiative. I do not 
complain. for this is a natural conse-
quence of the great complexity of the 
issues at stake. More Important, I do 
not complain of any sacrlf.ce of flexi-
bility which may be inherent In our need 
to act In agreement with our allles, for 
I am certain that we can all agree the 
Western alliance Is the cornerstone of 
the free world security. 
The second missing ingredient, in my 
view, Is the lack of recognition accorded 
to the efforts of our Government and to 
the etTorts of our allles over the years, 
to say nothing of the recent concentrated 
work over the past weeks and months, 
toward finding ways to negotiate this 
extremely serious problem. In !act, the 
headlines this morning contain news of 
western willlngness to widen the scope 
of envisaged negotiations, which con-
firms the activities of Mr. Dulles and his 
European counterparts. Clearly, our 
policy has not put us In a straitjacket. 
I think It is also clear that my col-
league has, in the fashion of Don Qulxote, 
been doing a little tllUng at a. stone wall, 
and that stone wall ls tbe Kremlin, not 
the East Germans. 
Despite these few difficulties I have 
encountered so far, I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Montana. In all 
seriousness. for a highly illuminating 
presentation of the crux of the Berlin 
problem. I am not prepared to comment 
in depth on his use!ul address. because 
I have not had time for that. However, 
as frequently happens, Mr. Walter Lipp-
mann's column of ti1is mornmg contains 
some thoughts v.•hlch I consider ex-
tremely pertinent to this subject. so I 
ask unanimous conli,ent that there may 
be pnnted at this point in my discussion 
the comments of Walter Lippmann in his 
article of this morning. 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed in the Rr:coao, 
as follows: 
MR. Dtn.Lr.s Is ND:Im) 
There Ia no reason to doubt that John 
Foster Dullea will onco again come out on 
top. carrlec1 through hla ordeal not only by 
his stamina, which Ia fabulous. but also by 
the knowlec1ge that he Ia at Ul.ls moment the 
lndl.&pensable man. There have been times 
In the past when thlnga were at the end or 
a chapter. and he could with gr~>Ce and dig-
nity have made way tor a younger ml!n. But 
not just now. This Ia a periOd when thlllgs 
are moving toward a climax. after which the 
world may be very diO'oroot, and. he, blmael!, 
Is at the climax or his career. 
There Ia no one else In the Western World 
who has authority. comparable with his, to 
lead tho enormously compleK negotiations 
about Germany and about Europe which In. 
one way or another are now unavoidable and. 
Imperative. I! the West moves. aa It must. 
!rom a policy of standing pat, to one or 
negotiation and compromJse, hla perb<lnal 
leadership will be the best guarantee that 
fiexlblllty Ia not fiabblness and that a strong 
and tough hand Ia In charge. The Russians 
will make no dangerous mistakes while he Is 
there. and our allies will be much less appre-
hensive. 
There Is one question which, If we knew 
the answer to It, would light up the whole 
situation. Why Is It that Moscow has opened 
up Berlin and the German queetlon now 
rather than, let us say, 2 years hence? The 
Russians know quite well that German opin-
Ion Ia evolving. and that Dr. Adenauer's re-
fusal to negotiate on a realistic basis will not 
be held to by h1s successors. In 2 years, Mr. 
Dulles will be out or omce, and until very 
recently there was no difference between his 
position and Or. Adenauer's. In 2 years, 
moreover. there will b&--1! the Russians be-
lieve what Senator SYMINGTON and others 
say-a marked shift In the beJance ot power. 
Why, then, are they In such a. burry now? 
My own guess, which rests only on hints and 
Inferences. Is that they regard the position 
In Eastern Germany, and perhaps also In 
Eastern Europe, as precarious and potentially 
explosive. They are deeply concerned, aa 
everyone knows. about West Oerman rearma-
ment, which will have been a.chleved In 
about 2 years. Why are they so concerned 
about It when they tbernaelvea have a very 
much bigger army anc1 are al.ao themselves 
a first-class nuclear power? When I asked 
some of the people I aaw In Moscow why they 
worried so much about West Oerman rearma-
ment when they could annihilate West Ger-
many with their lntermec11ate-ra.nge ml.eallee 
the stock answer waa that they feared an 
armed Germany backec1 by the United States. 
But 1 do not think that thla Ia the whole 
explanatton of thelr fear, or, rather, I do 
not think that It spells out the nature ot 
their !ear. My guess Is that they have no 
Illusions about the c11scontent of the East 
Oermans, and that what they feu Ia that 
the East Germans, when they ace a. strong 
West German army less than 2 hours away, 
may be aorely t.empted to atart e.n uprlalng 
In cahoots with omcera ot the West German 
army. It that happened, the !at would be 
In the nrc and both the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. would be Involved. 
Something of this sort Ia, I !eel sure, the 
cfux or the German problem todny. There 
Is an ever-present and growing danger of 
revolt In Eastern Europe which would entail 
Soviet Intervention In the Hungarian man-
ner and would unavoidably bring about a 
great war The RuS$Ians are undoubtedly 
worried about this, and truly responsible 
men In all the Western capitals are equnlly 
worried about lt. Only those who have more 
emotion than they have Imagination anc1 
foresight take the view that nn Enst Euro-
pean uprising woulc1 be wonderful and just 
what the free world wants. 
It Is the Impending danger In Eastern 
Europe which makes It Imperative to move 
toward German negotiations. For the best, 
and perhaps the only. way to avert the c1an-
ger Is to move toward the beginnings or the 
reunlncntlon ot the two Germanys. We 
$hould make the Kremlin understand that 
we approach the coming negotiations. not 
with Intent to provoke an uprising Ill Eastern 
Europe. but In order to find. an alterna-
tive to lt. 
The Russian problem In Germany anc1 Eu-
rope Is not how to conquer and absorb West-
ern Europe. This Is away beyond. anything 
that Is within their reach. The Russian 
problem Is how they can disengage them-
selves In Eastern Europe without jeopardiz-
Ing their own security. How can the satel-
lites become, not their violent enemies. but 
neutrals? At bottom the problem Ia bow to 
let go without falling otr and being run over. 
Mr. WU..EY. Mr. President, I have 
gone over these points which the dis-
tinguished Senator from Montana has 
made. The senator places great em~ 
phasls on the fact that ultimate unifica-
tion of Germany is inevitable, and that 
we should have recognized it and should 
have done more about it. 
Exactly what should we have done? 
When we are faced against the Krem-
lin, which has taken 500 million human 
beings Into its orbit, and when the 
United States has..placed, as it were, its 
Iron curtain against the approach onto 
West Germany and onto France and the 
Lowlands-what should we have done? 
Let us consider. The fact is that the 
Inevitability of the ultimate reunifica-
tion of Germany has been recognized by 
the Western countries since the end of 
World War II. That has been common 
talk. Germany has to be brought to-
Fether. Uniftcation has to come. 
We have not only recognized that !act, 
but we have also recognized that a di-
vided Germany constitutes a serious 
threat to the peace. Willy Brandt was 
quoted by the newspapers yesterday, 
after he had had a. talk with the ~est­
dent, as saying that definitely the Pres-
ident said we are not going out of Ber-
lln. We are sticking. We are there 
with the purposes we have always had. 
That, in substance, was the remark. 
We have not oniy recognized this fact, 
but we have recognized that a divided 
Germany constitutes a threat to the 
peace. Both the Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations since 1945 and 
1946 have made unrelenting efforts to 
bring the four zones together. I re-
member the etTorts which have been 
made time after time. 
We actually got an agreement at the 
Geneva Conference in 1955 for a re-
unification of Germany and for free 
elections. What happened? Of course, 
the Russians broke the agreement wide 
open. The Russians reneged on the 
agreement. All of the subsequent ef-
forts to achieve reunification, including 
the notes we sent last fall, have failed. 
We have been working at this a. long 
time. 
I desire to give credit where credit Is 
due. I do not care to say simply that 
we are at fault if we cannot get a. gov-
ernment to reason with us and to work 
with us. That is what has happened, so 
far as the Kremlin Is concerned, but we 
have been on the job. 
As I have said, in Geneva we obtained 
an agreement for free elections. Who 
pushed that agreement? We did. After-
ward It went out the window. The rea-
son the West Germans have been re-
butTed is that the Soviets have been un-
willing t'o agree to any plan of reunifica-
tion which would not guarantee the 
bolshevism of Western Germany and its 
annexation to Eastern Germany. 
This Is not the first time in world t.: -
tory that we have been unable to obtain 
agreements that were valid, and that 
would be kept by the other party. Out of 
52 agreements we made with the Krem-
lin, the Kremlin broke 50 of them. That 
Is the situation we are meeting. We must 
recognize the simple fact that the Soviets 
have a clutch hold on Eastern Germany. 
The Germans are not free. They are 
running out-400 a day, according lo 
Willy Brandt. When we look that fact 
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in the face, we begin to realize what the 
trouble is. 
The Senator from Montana suggests 
that the way to work toward reunifica-
tion would be to start by having the West 
G2rmans and the East Germans talk 
among themselves and att~mpt to ne~o­
t!ate the unification ot the two divisions 
o! Berlin. I heard that talk on the floor 
today. That Is a consummation devoutly 
to be wished, but we cannot make an 
agreement with the slave when the mas-
ter pas the slave under his thumb. That 
is the situation. We might as well recog-
nize lt. That Is what we have been try-
Ing to break down. It the master were to 
allow the slave freedom to work out his 
own salvation, 96 percent of the East 
Germans would vote for reunification. 
It Is dltllcult to see how the attempt to 
work out reunification could be any more 
successful than our past e!Torts with the 
Russians. We have tried to get the Rus-
sians to agree. The East Germaru are 
not free to negotiate on their own. That 
Is the big point. They are controlled by 
the Russians. and therefore they would 
continue to retlect the Russian control. 
In eiTect, the Senator Is saying In his 
speech that the West Germans should be 
more tlexlble; they should enter l!Uo 
negotiations with the East Germans. 
This Is something that the West German 
Government, up to date, has refused to 
do. The West German Government is 
an Independent nation It claims that 
East Germany Is a part of Germany. 
The contention is made that the United 
States can make the West Germans 
change their position and become more 
:ftexlble. 
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr President. will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. WILEY. Let me tlnlsh this para-
graph. 
The fact Is that West Germany Is a 
proud and powerful ally of the United 
States. As an allY. It has a mind o! Its 
own. and we cannot dictate to it. as the 
Russians are dictating to the East Ger-
mans. The West Germans are the ablest 
people In Europe. They know the situa-
tion: and when they take the posillon 
they have taken. they take It with their 
eyes OJX'n. The-y realize that they are 
under the thumb or the Ru!>~ian s. or the 
East Germ :til$. and they realize that they 
cannot t'vcn ncRotHite with the people 
who are the serfs. 
I now yield to the Senator from 
Montana. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I be-
lieve that there should be called to the 
~nator's attC'ntlon the !act that rt'la-
tlonshlps ex1st at. the present time be-
twee-n the F..ast. German Government and 
the West German Go~rnmt'nt. Such 
relationships have existed for somt' 
years. Those relationships arc based 
upon Interzonal agreements. The re-
sult. is that trade amounting to hundred-; 
o! millions of dollar. is generated be-
tween the two arc;,.,. 
The Senator aho makes the point that 
I 1.ecm to be advocatmg an Amcncan 
Initiative. What I have been trying to 
advocate Is a western mlliatlve. includ-
ing all the allies, and lncludmg West 
Germany. I do not think we can main-
tam a pctnfled policy. because we know 
that there Is no prospect of going for-
ward on that basis. 
We are facing a deadline, May 27. 1959, 
at which time the Soviet Union has In-
dicated it will have all Its troops and de-
pendent personnel withdrawn from the 
eastern sector of the city. I think we 
must come up with something In the way 
of alternatives. I was very pleased when 
Secretary Dulles came back and said 
that he would be willing to consider con-
cessions on a quid pro quo basis. I was 
delighted with the degree of succe~s the 
Secretary had achieved among our allies, 
Dr. Adenauer, General DeGaulle, and 
Prime Minister Macmillan. 
So I do not quite get the point the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin has 
In mind, because. as I recall the speech 
I made, there seems to be very little 
dlt:rerence between us. 
I expressed the hope that those In the 
State Department would give some con-
sideration to the speech made today, not 
because of any personal Interest I have 
In It, but because of the fact that some 
suggestions arc belna made, and perhaps 
out of those suggestions, or others which 
may be generated, will come a degree of 
success In meeting the dlmcultles which 
confront us In the German and Berlin 
situation. and out of which, perhaps, may 
come unification of the two Berllns and 
the two Germa11ys at an earlier date 
than any of us can anticipate at the 
moment. 
I thank the Senator for yielding to me 
and giving me an opportunity to answer 
him In part. 
Mr. \VILEY. Did the Senator wish to 
address anv particular question to me? 
In what direction did he desire to direct 
my thought? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I wished to bring 
to the attention of the Senator the fact 
that I understood him to say that I was 
advocating American !nlnatlvc. I was 
advocating Western Initiative, "~~•hlch 
would include all Allied Powers, and also 
Dr Adenauer. 
Mr. WILEY. I do not ~hlnk we are 
very far apart. 
The only thing I disagree with Is the 
Implication that there has bct'n no 
initiative. In my opinion the executive 
department, \\hose funcl!on It Is to 
ho.ndle foreign relations, has done a great 
job. As I said the other day. the situa-
tion is similar to that or the man who 
has an orne-ry jackass. He can talk to 
him and talk to him. but he h~.d better 
not gt't too clo~c to him, or he may be 
kiCkt'd. 
The Secretary of State and his assist-
ants have worked d1hcrnt1y at this prob-
lem; and because they cannot cct the 
Jackass to agree, they arc to blame. 
That is the sort of Implication which 
I do not like to have go out to the coun-
try. I want the country definitely to 
understand my figure of speech. 
We arc continually In the midst of a 
pohtlcal picture. I say, give credit where 
credit is due. Later, as I conclude my 
remarks, I shall have something to say 
about the distinguished Secretary ot 
State. He serve<! under Acheson. When 
I 'tl.'as chairman o! the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. I saw his work t 
ob~ervcd his work as a servant or the 
Democratic Party. I ha\'e seen him serve 
for 6 years under President Eisenhower. 
I have seen him get acquainted with this 
glo~. as was indicated by a distin-
guished columnist this morning, as no 
other man In history has done. He 
knows every neighborhood. He knows 
all the peoples. He_.il:nows the problems. 
He has dealt with them. 
Because we could not get the divergent 
Interests to agree, he Is to blame. That 
Is what I am objecting to. Such an Im-
plication is absolutely unfair. Un-
doubtedly It has had much to do with 
sending Secretary DuiiPs to the hospital. 
He Is only human. 
My next point Is that the Senator from 
Montana, In his speech, asks that not 
only the West Germans, but the United 
States, take a more flexible approach to 
the problem of German and European 
security. The S:mator from Montana 
mentioned the Rapacki plan and the 
Eden plan, and said we should explore 
both of them. We not only explored the 
Eden plan, but put It forward as ll. West-
ern proposal at the Geneva Summit Con-
terence. We have constantly been con-
slderlns all kinds of possible European 
security plans. We have agreed that we 
mu.t keep an open mind on this subJect. 
On the other hand, all' these plans 
Involve a general withdrawal of Western 
strength from Western Europe; and we 
must be careful not to engage In too 
much loose talk about the seeming re-
treat type of pollcy unless we have rea-
&on to bleleve that the Soviets are dis-
posed to Initiate a pullback toward their 
borders. As the Senator from Montana 
stated a few minutes ago, they would 
get out of East Berlin; but they would 
be on the line where troops would be 
ready to march In and take over West 
Berlin. 
Our people are not blind. They recog-
nize the fact that they are dealing with 
some of ~he most efficient-if T mi~ht 
call tl:em that-International M:.chla-
velllnns In history. In doing so they are 
going to protect the Interests of the West 
and or America. 
we agree that we must k~p ;:..n open 
mind on this subject. On the other 
hand. all these plans Involve a general 
Withdrawal of Western strength from 
Western Europe and we must be careful 
that we do not en~tae:e In too much loose 
talk about this seemingly retreat-type 
o! policy unle!\5 we have reason to believe 
that the sov1ets are disposed to initiate 
n simultaneous pullback of the1r forces 
toward their borders. Nothinr: in the 
prese-nt situation cives us hope that the 
Soviets are. In fact. willing to carry out 
n mt'aotng!ul pullback of thc1r forces. 
Too much general talk rcgardmg neutral 
zones In withdrawal or thinning .. at of 
our forces at th1s time. therefore . ..:ould 
r,ive the Impression of softness on our 
part and weakening of our resolve to 
stand firm in this situation. 
Finally, the distinguished Senator 
!rom Montana sa) that standing firm in 
Berlin Is a slogan and not a policy. 
The fact ts that standing firm is the 
bedrock of our policy. It ts quite true 
that. having taken this decision. the 
problem o! how we implement the stand 
Jn the face of the many variations in 
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which the threat can actually present 
itself to us must be worked out. That is 
exactnr what the executive branch has 
been exploring ever since the crisis de-
veloped and It was the primary reason 
that Secretary Dulles undertook his re-
cent trip. we and our all1es, are all 
aware that we must not only be agr~ed 
on the fundamental concept of standmg 
firm· but that we must also be agreed on 
the details of implementing this policy. 
It was to help work out a common agree-
ment on these details that the Secretary 
undertook this trip to London, Paris, and· 
Bonn. ~ M 
In other words, the senator .ron). on-
tana knows very well that the executive 
branch here, as well as the governments 
of our allies, knows that we must agree 
on the detailed Implementation of the 
policy In that we are all working now to 
·get agreement on these details. 
When we do get agreements, what 
good are they? What does experience 
teach us. Fifty out of 52 agreements 
were not worth the paper they were 
written on. The Kaiser said something 
like that before. He spoke about a 
treaty being a scrap of paper. We are 
dealing with' a people whose philosophy 
and morality in connection with inter-
national a.tralrs Is very low. 
My overall reaetion to the speech of 
the Senator !rom Montana, however, Is 
that It is a great deal more reasonable 
than many one has to listen to, an,ti 
there are a number of sections, as I have 
Indicated, in the speech which make 
pretty good sense. 
I do want to make very clear that, as 
the distinguished Senator has said, when 
the Executive Is "In the saddle" and has 
the responsibility to deal with crises, and 
that because the solution which one has 
hoped !or Is not forthcoming, that that 
is no reason to criticize the executive 
branch of our Government. The Execu-
tive has had to deal with the representa-
t ives of the Kremlin for many years. 
our past experience, as I Indicated, 
shows what agreements with the Krem-
lin are worth. 
I want to make It clear also. that In 
my humble opinlon, the executive de-
partment has done everything that It 
can do to bring about a settlement of 
the German Issue. as well as a settle-
ment on the wider scale of world ten-
sions, of which the Kremlin is the source. 
In my opinion the Berlin crisis in con-
nection with the May date is IX).erely an-
other Indication· of what we have had 
in the past, particularly some months 
ago In Formosa. It Is the purpose of the 
Kremlin to get our attention on one point 
on this little globe, and then do Its ne-
farious work at another point. The ex-
ecutive department Is keeping Its eye on 
the whole show, so to speak, not merely 
on the Kremlin, and It recognizes that 
this Is just a part of the world-dominat-
Ing Influence and philosophy of the 
Kremlin. 
Mr. President, when I heard the other 
evening that John Foster Dulles had gone 
to the hospital once again, I Issued a 
release, and I shall read that release at 
this point. I said: 
All Americana and many In tar ot! Ianda 
heard with sorrow o! the hoaplte.llzatlon ot 
John Foster Dullea. Countleaa thousands 
will pray tor hls recovery. 
When I think ot him, Burke's definition 
ot a statesman comes to my mind: He pos-
sessed "e. <Usposltlon to preserve, e.n a bility 
to Improve." 
He has always been "e. !rlend to t ruth; 
In action talth!ul, and In honor clear: who 
broke no promises, served no private end." 
These words ot Pope characterize this great 
publlc servant. 
Let us hope that during hla convl1.1escence 
the carping voices wUI cease. 
In my opinion no American In the last 
50 years has given ot hlmsel! more un.stlnt-
lngly and dedicated hlmsel! more to preserve 
American than Foster Dulles. When others 
threw br icks at him, he smiled and kept on 
working tor the general wel!are. No man 
In American history has become so well ac-
quainted with this now neighborhood world 
and Ita problema. 
So we join with the countlesa thousands 
who wish htm e. speedy recovery. His coun. 
try needs him. 
As the President and Walter Lippmann 
have said, the country needs him. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield to 
the Senator from PennsylvanJa. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have 
listened with a great deal of Interest to 
the ex~emely able address by my good 
friend from Wisconsin In defense of 
the State Department. 
Mr. WILEY. I thank the Senator. 
Mr. CLARK. I should !Ike to ask my 
good friend this question. Earlier in his 
remarks he ofiered for the RECORD the 
column written by Walter Lippmann 
published In the Washington Post this 
mornJng. My question is whether he 
agrees with that column. 
Mr. WILEY. I took the column from 
the paper, and the part 'that I read I 
agreed with. However, I shall have to go 
over It very closely, because the Impli-
cation is that I am not aware of some-
thing in the article. I have not read It 
closely, because I have been waiting for 
the Senator from Montana to conclude 
his remarks, so tl'iat I may obtain the 
floor. 
Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to 
have my good friend review Mr. Lipp-
mann's column, which I personally be-
lieve is a sound one, )>ut which, It seems 
to me, Is rather Inconsistent with the 
point of view which my friend from Wis-
consin has been so ably expounding. 
I should like to call to his attention 
the parts of the column I have In mind, 
and I should like to ask him whether he 
agrees that the principal point Mr. Lipp-
mann makes is that the Russians are 
frightened by the situation In eastern 
Europe and that they fear an explosion 
or revolution, and that such an explo-
sion or revolution might require them to 
repeat what they did In Hun'gary; that 
If they did It in Eastern Germany what 
they did In Hungary It would bring 
about the great danger of starting 
world war Ill, because we would be un-
likely to permit East Germany to go 
down the drain the way we let Hungary 
go. Mr. Lippmann suggests that the 
problem Is how we can prevent a revo-
lution In a sa.telllte country and how we 
can maintain a situation In which the 
Russians can get .out of satellite coun-
tries and the satellite countries can re-
main neutral and Berlin and Germany 
can still be free. 
I suspect that what Mr. Lippmann 
says makes good sense and is pretty 
much the essence of the brilliant ad-
dress made by the Senator from Mon-
tana, with his nJne points that he urges 
upon the administration in that address. 
I do hope that the Senator from Wis-
consin will take anQther look at the 
Walter Lippmann column, and I hope 
to find that he Is In agreement with lt. 
Mr. WILEY. I shall be happy to read 
it again very closely, because I am al-
ways Interested In that the statesman 
Llppmann-and I would call him that-
has to say. 
When he speaks about the ferment 
in Europe, that is only a part of the 
story. There 1s no question that there 
Is a ferment all over the world. One 
of the problems which is confusing the 
Russians and giving them much trouble 
at present, as the Senator probably 
knows, Is the attitude of the Chinese. 
There are 650 million Chinese who may 
be "on the go." All these matters have 
had the consideration of the Depart-
ment of State. The Committee on For-
eign Relations has had this testimony 
before it. 
Willy Brandt, the Mayor of West Ber-
lin, was asked the other day whether 
the people in Poland, RumanJa, Bul-
garia, and the Baltic States had falle.n 
asleep and were satisfied with the1r 
rulers. The answer, In his judgment, 
was, "No". Of course, that gives trouble 
to the Kremlin. That is a part of the 
Russian problem. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the 
Senator fut'ther yield? 
Mr. WILEY. I yield. 
Mr. CLARK. I have no Intention of 
attempting to engage In a debate con-
cernJng whether the action of the State 
Department In the past has been right 
or wrong. I think the Senator from 
Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] was very wise, 
indeed, in avoiding that pitfall, which 
It would be so easy to fall Into. 
I suggest to the Senator from Wis-
consin that we cannot solve this prob-
lem In the Interest of peace and freedom 
merely by saying over and over again 
that the Russians have broken 50 out of 
52 agreements, and that therefore it 
does not do any good to talk to them. 
I suggest that we must talk an~ ta~k 
and live with them, or else we wtll d1e 
with them. 
There are such things as self -execut-
Ing agreements, particularly with respect 
to the withdrawal of forces. which are 
enfoz:cible. and this regardless of the 
efiect of the written word. It has been 
my feeling that to have a more flexible 
policy toward negotiation is highly 
desirable. 
I think the Senator from Montana 
has rendered a distinct service, because 
In many ways he Is sending word to 
the State Department and to the coun-
try that. at least so far as a majority 
of the U.S. Senate is concerned, we are 
ready right now to negotiate a meaning-
ful agreement. 
We do not dismiss from our minds 
plans which were ridiculed when they 
were first brought forward 2 years ago 
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by Mr. Kennan. Mr. Galtsklll, and Mr. 
Rapackl, and others. We will talk about 
anything In· the Interest of getting a 
workable agreement toward peace. We 
are not afraid to negotiate. We do not 
trust the Ru~slans any more than some 
of our friends In the State Department 
do. But that Is no reason for not sitting 
down at the table and talking with 
them. 
Mr. WILEY. Again, the Senator from 
Pennsyl\•anla has made an Implied at-
tack on the other branch of the Govern-
ment. 
The Senator talks about fiexlblllty. 
Why docs he not talk about flexibility 
with the people who are most concerned 
with It, Instead of making a general 
statement? That Is the point I am mak-
Ing. When I tried lawsuits. I tried to 
anlve at conclusions on the !nets. not 
on Implications. not on rumors. That 
was my only point In raising this partic-
ular Issue. 
'rhe Senator refers to the breaking 
by the Russians of 50 out of 52 agree-
ments. Let me tell the Senntor that It 
was In the days before Pearl Harbor that 
this Chamber was asleep; the President 
was asleep; the people were asleep; the 
Army, the Navy, &nd the Air Force were 
asleep. They said It could not happen. 
It did. That was the only reason I re-
ferred to the breakm~ by the Russians 
of 50 out of 52 a11recments. I do not 
want to ha\·c this country go to sleep on 
the generality that it is possible to deal 
with a skunk or someone \\hO docs not 
keep f:uth. 
Mr. CLARK. I think \\hat the Sena-
tor from Wtscon•ln has said nnd \1 hat 
I have said \\Ill appear acclll ately m the 
RECORD, as our good h lends, the Offic1al 
Reporters. \\UI 1111te 1t out. I have no 
intention of cngagm!lln furthl'r colloquy, 
other U1an to say that I tmpltcd nothing. 
It. was not I who spoke of the bteakmg 
of 50 out of 52 agt c<·llll't1ls: lt was my 
good fri<•nd. the S<'nator from \\'!<con-
sin, who dtd so. I am contend to il't the 
RECORD stand as tt "ill appear m pnnt 
tomorrow mornmg. 
Mr. WILEY. I ngr<'e that I made the 
statl'ment. I did so for the Simple rca-
son that men !Ike the Scnator from Pcnn-
b:Vivama were h<'re at the tune of Pearl 
Harbor and had s:ud tt could not hap-
pen. I do not 11 ant the brcakmg of 50 
out of 52 agreements to be forcottcn by 
the S<'nator from Pennsyh ant a <'ltlwr. 
l\!r CLAHK. At the tunc of Pearl 
Harbor. I" as In the un1fonn of my coun-
try, and not on the tloot of the Senate. 
l\Ir WILhY. Oh, )I.'S. But other SC'n-
!ltoiS were talking as the &nator from 
Penns)l\anla Is now spcnkmc. 'fhat :s 
the only point I am makmg. 
::\tr. Pre~idcnt, I yield the floor. 
l\1r . LAUSCIIE. Mt• Pit' !dent, nt the 
ve1y be ltllllll , I commend the ~enator 
from ~.lontnna !or th,. study v.hich he 
has r.tn·n to the prob!cm he dlscu •<'d 
today. Spenkin for myself. I v.at.t the 
So\ let Union to know thnt th<' Scnnto1 s 
of the United Stntes ate Intently de-
sirous of obtalnmg peace for the people 
of the world. Whtle I may ~<'e some 
dtfficullies m carrymg out the plans sur-
gc:.tcd hy the s~nator from !\fontana, 
and projcctm:; thcm.elves over Ius talk. 
I see a fervent purpose and desire to 
bring about peace In the world. That Is 
the light In which I wish the people of 
Europe and the people of the world would 
understand the Intention and the pur-
pose of the u.s. Senate today. 
What are some of the weaknesses 
which I see In the proposal made by the 
Senator from Montana? The Soviet 
says: "We will withdraw !rom East Ber-
lin." The question Is, how far will they 
withdraw? In what posture will they 
be after they have wlthdra\}'n? In what 
position would we be If we withdrew !rom 
West Berlin and moved a. distance o!, 
say, 120 miles to the west? 
My query would be: Based upon the 
past conduct of the Soviet Union, could 
we rely upon their word that they have 
withdrawn and would stay withdrawn? 
Or would there be the necessity o! nego-
tl:~tlng In a manner which would pre-
clude the possibility of their abandonJng 
their word and movlng Immediately back 
Into the area out of which they came I! 
conditions devj!loped which were un-
satisfactory 
Second. for the people of West Berlin 
and East B~rlln to negotiate would be 
~imple. I think It Is generally agreed 
that 95 percent of them would subscribe 
to the philosophy of the West and would 
rep'-!diate that of the East. If there 
were a umfi~:ttlon of the government of 
West Berlm and the government of the 
Sovtet and communism In East Berlin, 
m}' query Is: \\'hat type of government 
would result? I cannot !01 get\\ hat hap-
pened In China when a coalition govern-
ment \\·as formed I cannot forget \\hat 
happened m YugoslaVIa when a coalition 
government \\OS formed, and Mlkhallo-
' 1ch. the spirit of the ficht for freedom, 
was scutll('d. The result of IJmt coali-
tion go\·ernment was that the Com-
munists took control. 
Nor can I forcet what happened In 
Poland when the l'ov1ct Union proposed 
a coalition go\ernment. The coalition 
covernment "as created, the Red 
troops were there. they took control nnd 
rave orders. and soon the government of 
Poland became a Communist govern-
ment. 
But in this situation there Is one gle:un 
of light wh1ch woulcl cause me to analyze 
the East Berlin and the West Berlin Sit-
uation in the belief that It miGht be 
distingutshcd from the Yucoslavta bttu-
atton. the Chma Situation, and the 
Poland sltuatton. In China, the Sov1ct 
troops were In the northern part of that 
country, and they dictated what \\liS to 
happen. A similar situation existed m 
Poland. In Yugoslavta, the word "hlch 
came from Bntaln and from the Unite<! 
Stntes was th:n l\llha!lo1 tch should be 
abandoned and 1: tto should be accept('d, 
What would happen m East Berlin and 
In West Berlln tf those governments 
combmed and tf the Sonct would st11y 
back? In all the other countt ies I have 
mentioned, condittons \H're h·1 tile for 
the overthrow of those \1 ho 11 anted fn·c-
dom and for the mstallnllOn of those 
who wanted dtctatorshlp. But that con-
dition would not prentil In Germany. 
A'> we have said, in Germany 95 p<·rct•nt 
of th::! people would stand by the r,OI'Crll · 
;ncnts of the free Wl·:.t. 
But despite my belief that these 
dangers are connected with the sugges-
tions which have been made by the Sen-
ator from Montana, I believe It Is the 
responsibility of the executive branch of 
our Government and of this legislative 
branch to explore every means of reach-
ing an agreement, restricted only by the 
proposition that we maintain our honor 
and that we do not fall Into a pit which 
would leave us weaker, after we nego-
tiated, than we were before we began 
to negotiate. 
Mr. President, I yield the floor. 
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